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AND OTHER FIRST AMENDMENTS 
Steven G. Gey*
This Article addresses the fracturing of modern First Amendment law into multiple, different sets 
of rules and rationales for the protection of speech, depending on what kind of speech is at issue.  
It is no longer accurate to say that there is one universal First Amendment jurisprudence; indeed, 
it is no longer accurate to say that there is one First Amendment.  Today there are many 
different—often very different—First Amendments for different types of speech.  On a practical 
level, this fracturing of First Amendment law creates difficulties only in that it requires litigators 
and judges addressing First Amendment issues to identify the category or categories into which a 
particular example of speech fits.  But on a theoretical level, the fracturing of First Amendment 
jurisprudence is much more problematic.  These theoretical problems arise because First 
Amendment jurisprudence is not just a collection of narrow rules and doctrines.  These rules and 
doctrines are based on series of presuppositions about the nature of individuals, the proper 
relationship between the government and its citizens, the extent to which society should accept risks 
posed by dangerous or antisocial ideas, and the liability of speakers for the consequences of their 
speech.  The problem is that the courts make one set of assumptions when dealing with one area of 
expression and very different (and often contradictory) assumptions when dealing with other areas 
of expression. 
This Article starts by describing the baseline for all free speech jurisprudence—the jurisprudence 
that applies to political advocacy.  It then distills from the Court’s major political speech cases a set 
of principles that I call “the Brandenburg paradigm.”  The remainder of the Article discusses 
whether the theoretical assumptions made in the Brandenburg paradigm also should be applied 
to areas of speech other than political advocacy.  I address several areas of expression specifically, 
including threats, obscenity, “teaching speech,” and student speech in public schools.  An 
assessment of these different speech categories indicates that there is no good reason to ignore the 
Brandenburg paradigm outside the political advocacy category.  Indeed, a very good reason 
exists to apply the Brandenburg paradigm to the entire range of First Amendment issues:  the 
assumptions that underlie Brandenburg—for example, that citizens control the government 
rather than vice versa, that citizens should develop their own value systems free of government 
coercion, and that the government should suppress ideas it dislikes only in the face of serious, 
concrete harms stemming from that expression—should not be regarded solely as artifacts of the 
First Amendment but rather as indispensable elements of constitutional democracy itself. 
Modern First Amendment jurisprudence increasingly resembles a 
game of three-dimensional chess.  One dimension contains the spe-
cial procedural rules that attach to First Amendment cases, such as 
the prior restraint doctrine or the requirement that certain regula-
tions be submitted to judicial oversight before they are enforced 
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against individual speakers.  A second dimension includes the special 
interpretive rules that apply in First Amendment cases, such as the 
overbreadth doctrine, the more rigorous treatment of due process 
rules against vague regulations, and the general prohibition against 
unfettered administrative discretion in regulating speech.  The third 
dimension includes the many different constitutional rules that apply 
to diverse types of expressive content.  When these various dimen-
sions are put together, they seem to produce a system of free speech 
regulation governed by not one, but many different First Amend-
ments.  To know whether any particular expression is constitutionally 
protected, therefore, the observer first has to determine which First 
Amendment applies. 
Of course, at one level this perception is clearly wrong; there is 
obviously only one First Amendment in the constitutional text, and 
the same forty-five words apply to every instance in which the gov-
ernment attempts to regulate or suppress speech or religion.  On the 
other hand, if one focuses on the doctrine and jurisprudence that the 
courts have gleaned from these forty-five words, it is not implausible 
to suggest that in fact many different First Amendments apply to the 
government’s regulation of individual expression.  Indeed, the sub-
ject-specific First Amendments have proliferated to the point that it is 
becoming difficult to keep track of exactly how many there are.  A 
non-exhaustive list of First Amendments might include the following:  
a political speech First Amendment,1 a “true threats” First Amend-
ment,2 a national security First Amendment,3 a “teaching speech” 
First Amendment,4 a fighting words First Amendment,5 a hostile au-
 1 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (describing the First Amendment rules 
protecting political speech, which do not permit the government to punish a speaker un-
less the government can prove that the speaker engaged in incitement, created a clear 
and present danger, and intended to cause immediate harm as a result of the speech); see 
also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927–28 (1982) (applying Branden-
burg to aggressively menacing political speech); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) 
(per curiam) (applying Brandenburg and elaborating on the Brandenburg immediate harm 
requirement). 
 2 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (noting that the First Amendment permits 
“a State to ban a ‘true threat’”); United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976) (describing one possible standard for adjudicat-
ing First Amendment “true threats”). 
 3 See N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726–27 (1971) (asserting that “only gov-
ernmental allegation and proof that publication [of a national security document] must 
inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperil-
ing the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim re-
straining order”). 
 4 See Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of cer-
tiorari) (noting that “[w]hile the requirement that the consequence be ‘imminent’ is jus-
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dience First Amendment,6 an obscenity First Amendment,7 an inde-
cency First Amendment,8 a commercial speech First Amendment,9 a 
First Amendment that deals with public schools,10 another that deals 
with public employees,11 and yet another that deals with government-
financed speakers.12  These divisions within First Amendment law are 
complicated further by the Court’s willingness to apply to First 
Amendment cases idiosyncratic interpretive and procedural rules. 
The problem with these multiple First Amendments is that once 
one moves away from the core First Amendment political speech ju-
risprudence, there is no coherent theory to explain the widely varying 
protection of speech within the other First Amendment categories.  It 
is clear that the protection of speech in First Amendment categories 
other than political advocacy falls far short of the protection offered 
in cases such as Brandenburg v. Ohio,13 but it is not clear why. 
There are several well-rehearsed arguments defending the general 
concept of multi-tiered First Amendment protections, but few of 
these arguments relate to the specific types of speech that fall into the 
less-protected speech categories.  Specifically, none of the arguments 
for multi-tiered First Amendment protection attempt to explain why 
the assumptions the Court makes in its political speech cases about 
tified with respect to mere advocacy, the same justification does not necessarily adhere to 
some speech that performs a teaching function”). 
 5 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972) (permitting governments to punish fight-
ing words, defined as words that are likely to cause injury or instigate an immediate 
breach of the peace). 
 6 See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (describing the circumstances 
under which a speaker can be arrested for antagonizing a hostile audience). 
 7 See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987) (modifying the third, artistic value com-
ponent of the Miller standard); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth a 
three-part constitutional standard for prosecuting obscene materials). 
 8 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750–51 (1978) (permitting the government to 
strictly regulate indecency on radio and television during certain parts of the day). 
 9 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) 
(noting that “[t]he Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech 
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression”). 
 10 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (upholding sanctions 
against a student who used a mild double entendre in a speech at a school assembly and 
asserting that “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”). 
 11 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 147 (1983) (articulating the First Amendment 
standard dealing with speech by public employees, emphasizing that the protection ap-
plies primarily to speech on matters of public concern). 
 12 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–200 (1991) (permitting the government to restrict 
the speech of government grantees on the grounds that, in government speech cases, 
grantees are speaking on behalf of the government rather than as private persons, and 
therefore the First Amendment does not apply). 
 13 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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the nature of individuals and the broader society should not also ap-
ply to nonpolitical speech.  The most the Court ever offers in this 
vein is the sort of flippant comment made by Justice Stevens in an in-
decent speech case, that “few of us would march our sons and daugh-
ters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual 
Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our choice.”14  At first glance, 
this phrase seems to do little more than crystallize the Court’s recog-
nition of the common perception that some speech is inherently 
more valuable than other speech.  Upon closer reflection, however, 
the notion that the government should incorporate into law popular 
disfavor of certain categories of nonpolitical ideas seems deeply in-
consistent with the Court’s general recognition in its political speech 
cases that the government may not engage in viewpoint or content 
regulation.  Thus, the Court’s few attempts to explain why it system-
atically provides less protection to some categories of speech than 
others is deeply unsatisfying. 
This Article addresses the dilemma posed by the Court’s practice 
of creating multiple First Amendments for different categories of 
speech in two ways.  First, the Article will attempt to distill from the 
Court’s political speech cases a series of propositions that seem to go-
vern current constitutional doctrine regarding “core” political 
speech.  This will produce something that I will call the “Brandenburg 
paradigm.”  The remainder of the Article will apply this paradigm to 
other categories of speech, in order to assess why the general ap-
proach to speech developed in the political speech cases should not 
apply to various nonpolitical speech categories as well.  The Article 
will also address the broader theoretical and practical arguments in 
favor of subdividing the First Amendment into political and nonpoli-
tical speech categories that each have different levels of protection. 
The general conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that 
the Court violates its own mandates from the political speech cases 
when it ratchets down protection for speech falling into the nonpoli-
tical speech categories.  While there are aspects of the Brandenburg 
paradigm that do not fit the regulatory problems that arise with re-
gard to certain nonpolitical speech categories, in general Brandenburg 
can tell us a great deal about how much protection should be offered 
to speech having nothing to do with politics or advocacy.  Brandenburg 
is, in the end, not really about politics, elections, or disputes about 
specific political policies.  Brandenburg is really about defining a con-
stitutional attitude about the proper role of intellectual freedom in 
 14 Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 
Apr. 2010] THE BRANDENBURG PARADIGM 975 
 
 
the life of each citizen living within a constitutional democracy; it is 
about each individual citizen’s freedom from governmental con-
straints in all matters of the mind—even if those matters could not in 
any sense be classified as political. 
I.  POLITICAL ADVOCACY AND THE BRANDENBURG PARADIGM 
The basics of Brandenburg and the First Amendment right to en-
gage in political advocacy are well known to anyone with a passing 
familiarity with constitutional law.  The standard history of First 
Amendment rights offers a tale of blossoming freedom, in which the 
Supreme Court took less than 100 years to produce a system guaran-
teeing virtually absolute protection of free speech within the realm of 
political advocacy.  The story starts before World War I, when free-
speech rights essentially did not exist.  The system at that time was so 
unprotective that the Court (including Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes) was even willing to countenance criminal convictions for the 
publication of tracts encouraging insignificant crimes such as public 
nudity.15  The story then turns to World War I, during which numer-
ous antiwar activists and members of left-wing political parties were 
sent to prison for opposing American involvement in the war.  The 
Supreme Court responded to this trend by articulating a “clear and 
present danger” First Amendment standard that did little to provide 
protection for the speech of political dissidents.  The source of opti-
mism in this period came not from the Court itself, but rather two 
dissenters within the Court.  Justices Holmes and Brandeis produced 
three opinions that arguably created the structure of the modern 
First Amendment protection of free speech.16  These opinions articu-
lated principles that continue to guide the Court in its modern politi-
cal speech jurisprudence. 
It took almost fifty years, however, for the Court to officially em-
brace either the spirit or the full measure of protections advocated in 
those Holmes and Brandeis opinions.  The route to the Court’s adop-
 15 See Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 275–78 (1915) (upholding a conviction for “en-
courag[ing] and advocat[ing] disrespect for [the] law” based on the publication of the 
nudist work “The Nude and the Prudes”). 
 16 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373–74 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (describ-
ing a number of restrictions on the regulation of speech under the First Amendment); 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (describing limita-
tions on government regulation of speech and on the clear and present danger stan-
dard); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(introducing an immediacy component into the clear and present danger First Amend-
ment standard). 
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tion of these opinions was convoluted.  It included, for example, sev-
eral opinions during the 1930s and 1940s in which the Court over-
turned convictions for political advocacy but without articulating 
clear reasons why the government had not met its constitutional bur-
dens.17  Then, during the McCarthy era, the Court announced that it 
was adopting the Holmes and Brandeis approach,18 but only after ar-
ticulating a constitutional standard that had little to do with Holmes 
and Brandeis and that provided little additional protection for the 
speech of the dissident political activists who most engaged the gov-
ernment’s attention during that era.19  As the McCarthy era waned, 
the Court began to retreat from its broad deference to government 
attempts to regulate political speech,20 and by the late 1960s the 
Court had provided a First Amendment foundation solid enough to 
support Brandenburg. 
For such an important case, the Brandenburg decision is a bit of a 
mess, even if the facts of the case were straightforward.  In Branden-
burg, a member of the Ku Klux Klan made inflammatory statements 
about racial and religious minorities at a public rally.21  He was con-
victed and ordered to serve one to ten years in jail under Ohio’s crim-
inal syndicalism statute,22 a statute whose legacy stretched back to the 
assassination of President McKinley, and whose original intent was, 
ironically, to stem the speech of supporters of the International 
Workers of the World and other radical leftists.23  The Supreme Court 
 17 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 90, 105–06 (1940) (reversing on First Amendment 
grounds the conviction of a labor organizer for picketing in support of a strike); Hern-
don v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 261 (1937) (reversing on First Amendment grounds the con-
viction of an individual for his membership in and solicitation of members for the Com-
munist Party); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365–66 (1937) (reversing on First 
Amendment grounds the conviction of an individual for participating in the organization 
of a meeting for the Communist Party). 
 18 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951) (“Although no case subsequent to 
Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the majority opinions in those cases, there is 
little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis ration-
ale.”). 
 19 Id. at 510 (adopting a standard first suggested in the appellate court by Judge Learned 
Hand, which required the courts to gauge the “evil” advocated by the speaker against the 
likelihood that the evil will take place.  Under such a standard, the advocacy of violent 
revolution is such a grave “evil” that the government will likely be allowed to suppress the 
advocacy even though the probability of revolution occurring is low). 
 20 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312–327 (1957) (highlighting the Dennis standard 
in order to emphasize that abstract advocacy of violent revolution is protected under the 
First Amendment). 
 21 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445–47 (1969). 
 22 Id. at 445. 
 23 For the best historical account of the development of criminal syndicalism laws, see 
Woodrow C. Whitten, Criminal Syndicalism and the Law in California:  1919–1927, 
 
Apr. 2010] THE BRANDENBURG PARADIGM 977 
 
 
overturned his conviction on free-speech grounds, in an opinion that 
is both murky and inelegant.  The opinion was originally assigned to 
Justice Abe Fortas, but before he could complete it he was forced to 
leave the Court for financial improprieties.24  Justice Brennan com-
pleted the opinion (with a few subtle amendments that greatly in-
creased the free-speech protections offered by the decision), and the 
Court issued it per curiam.25
To most observers, the important thing about Brandenburg is the 
First Amendment standard that the decision sets forth to govern all 
government efforts to regulate political advocacy.  This standard is 
now one of the most well-established aspects of modern constitu-
tional doctrine, but newcomers to Brandenburg may have a hard time 
discerning the elements of the standard from the language actually 
used in the opinion.  The relevant phrases from the opinion assert: 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit 
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law viola-
tion except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.26
This language creates a three-part standard for government regula-
tion of political speech.  The first part of the standard is drawn from 
the early Holmes dissents and requires that the government must 
show an imminent threat of harm before regulating speech.27  The 
second part of the standard is drawn from the early Learned Hand 
free speech opinion Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten28 and allows the 
government to prosecute speech only if the speech explicitly incites 
illegal action.29  The third part of the standard allows the government 
TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC’Y, March 1969, at 1, 3–4 (tracing the lineage of the criminal 
syndicalism statutes from the days following McKinley’s assassination to the period domi-
nated by governmental fear of the Industrial Workers of the World).  Ohio passed its ver-
sion of the criminal syndicalism statute in 1919.  See id. at 65. 
 24 See Bernard Schwartz, Justice Brennan and the Brandenburg Decision—a Lawgiver in Action, 
79 JUDICATURE 24, 27–28 (1995). 
 25 Id. at 28 (“[Brennan’s] changes completely altered the nature of the Brandenburg opin-
ion, converting it from one that confirmed the clear and present danger test to one that 
virtually did away with the test as the governing standard in First Amendment cases.”). 
 26 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
 27 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (describing limi-
tations on government regulation of speech and the clear and present danger standard); 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (introducing 
an immediacy component into the clear and present danger First Amendment standard). 
 28 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 29 See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:  Some 
Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 763 (1975) (comparing the two elements of 
Brandenburg and noting that the Brandenburg standard adopts the most protective ele-
ments of both the Holmes and Hand approaches). 
978 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
 
to prosecute only those who intend through their expression to cause 
harm.30
Operating in combination, the three components of the Branden-
burg standard provide virtually absolute protection of political 
speech—even when that speech creates an atmosphere in which 
harm (including violent harm) may result.  In the years following 
Brandenburg, the Supreme Court seemed to go out of its way to em-
phasize that it meant what it said about protecting political speech.  
In Hess v. Indiana,31 for example, the Court applied Brandenburg to 
protect the speech of a protester yelling to a crowd “[w]e’ll take the 
fucking street later” or “[w]e’ll take the fucking street again”32 in a 
context where violent confrontations between police and protesters 
had occurred in the recent past and were likely to occur again.  Like-
wise, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,33 the Court applied Branden-
burg to protect the speech of a political activist arguing in favor of an 
economic boycott of local stores by explicitly threatening his audi-
ence with phrases such as:  “If we catch any of you going in any of 
them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”34  The Su-
preme Court brushed off the argument that this speech was beyond 
the pale of legitimate political discourse by casually concluding that 
“[s]trong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely 
channeled in purely dulcet phrases.”35
The Brandenburg/Hess/Claiborne Hardware line of cases marks a 
clear advance for the cause of free speech in the realm of political 
advocacy.  By requiring the government to show both explicit incite-
ment and a truly immediate threat of harm stemming from the 
speech, the Court essentially has articulated a constitutional standard 
that the government will almost never be able to satisfy.  Subtle 
speakers will evade prosecution by cloaking their violent ideas in am-
biguous or indirect language, and all speakers will be immune from 
legal liability unless the violent or illegal actions that they advocate 
occur precisely at the time of the speech.  Any lapse in time between 
speech and action frees the speaker from the legal consequences of 
his or her advocacy.  The protections offered by the standard are fur-
 30 This element of the Brandenburg standard applies most often in free association cases.  See 
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972) (“The government has the burden of establish-
ing a knowing affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a 
specific intent to further those illegal aims.”). 
 31 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
 32 Id. at 107. 
 33 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 34 Id. at 902. 
 35 Id. at 928. 
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ther enhanced by the Court’s decision a decade prior to Brandenburg 
to treat all forms of advocacy the same—regardless of whether the 
advocacy related to a specifically or quintessentially political issue.36
Much of what has been said so far in this Part is a commonplace 
recitation of basic First Amendment doctrine relating to the constitu-
tional protection of political advocacy.  This aspect of First Amend-
ment law is no longer terribly controversial.  Brandenburg itself was 
decided at the end of the Warren Court era, when the Court’s atten-
tiveness to the protection of civil liberties was at its apex.  Brandenburg 
was strongly and unanimously reaffirmed, however, in Claiborne 
Hardware, which was decided after a series of presidential appoint-
ments had moved the Supreme Court far to the right of its liberal 
Warren Court days.  No one on the Court these days has expressed a 
desire to revisit either Brandenburg or the theory and mechanisms of 
protecting political advocacy that the case inaugurated. 
Although the mechanics of Brandenburg and its progeny are the 
usual focus of articles and cases dealing with the protection of politi-
cal advocacy, there are other aspects of the Court’s political advocacy 
decisions that give those cases a resonance beyond the political con-
text.  These deeper aspects of the Court’s political advocacy decisions 
relate to the Court’s attitude toward the connection between speech 
and action, the proper relationship of a citizen and the government, 
and the way in which regulatory authorities should be allowed to in-
terpret and control the expression of those acting outside society’s 
mainstream.  Considered together, these broader attitudes form what 
I term the Brandenburg paradigm.  The real importance of Branden-
burg and its political-speech ilk lies in the components of this para-
digm, rather than in the mechanics of the doctrine relating to the 
regulation of political advocacy.  The components of the paradigm 
are more important than the doctrine itself because the paradigm 
provides a theory of free speech that is relevant beyond the precise 
context of Brandenburg.  Because the paradigm offers a theory of free-
speech that applies beyond the realm of simple political advocacy, 
however, it raises the dilemma addressed in this Article:  If the Court 
believes so strongly in certain precepts of free speech, then why does 
the Court refuse to apply those precepts in so many different areas of 
First Amendment law?  To put the question more specifically:  Does 
 36 Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v.  Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 
(1959) (“[The Constitution’s] guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that 
are conventional or shared by a majority.  It protects advocacy of the opinion that adul-
tery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax.”). 
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the Court’s various explanations for not applying its own paradigm of 
free speech outside the political speech area make sense? 
The remainder of this Part will identify and briefly describe the 
eight major components of the Brandenburg paradigm.  The next Part 
will investigate several areas of non-political speech, in which the 
Court provides significantly lower levels of protection for speech and 
refuses to apply several different aspects of the Brandenburg paradigm.  
In the final Part, I will offer a brief argument for applying the Bran-
denburg paradigm far more extensively in First Amendment jurispru-
dence than the Court is currently willing to countenance. 
A.  The Components of the Brandenburg Paradigm 
The eight components of the Brandenburg paradigm are:  (1) the 
requirement of absolute ideological agnosticism; (2) the harm prin-
ciple; (3) the immediacy requirement; (4) the assertion of high col-
lective risk tolerance; (5) the immunization of speakers for most re-
sponses of listeners; (6) the assumption of listener incredulity; (7) the 
proposition that form and content are indistinguishable; and (8) the 
principle that the identified dangers posed by speech should be re-
dressed by censorship only if there is no other option.  Each of these 
components of the Brandenburg paradigm can be found in the 
Court’s political speech cases, and some can also be found in the 
Court’s decisions discussing the rules on government regulation of 
the content and viewpoint of speech—which often refer to the 
Court’s political speech doctrine as the source of the rules that gov-
ernment regulation of speech is always impermissible (if based on 
viewpoint) or almost always impermissible (if based on content).37  
The discussion below will draw on these cases to flesh out the eight 
components of the Brandenburg paradigm and the Court’s general 
view of the role that speech should play in a world governed by the 
First Amendment. 
1.  Absolute Ideological Agnosticism 
The heart and soul of the Brandenburg paradigm is the central 
precept that the government cannot regulate speech simply because 
 37 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995) (“It 
is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive con-
tent or the message it conveys. . . . When the government targets not subject matter, but 
particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all 
the more blatant. . . . Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content dis-
crimination.”). 
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the government disagrees with the content of the speech or the point 
of view of the speaker.  In a world governed by a First Amendment 
that is organized around the principles established in Brandenburg, 
government is an agnostic entity.  This does not mean that the gov-
ernment can never take a point of view about political matters; of 
course, the government will express a point of view about political 
matters all the time.  The government is a political entity, and virtu-
ally all of its actions that advance a particular policy will also express a 
political viewpoint.  The Brandenburg paradigm typically applies not to 
those within the government advancing the government’s own per-
spectives, but rather to actions taken by those within the government 
to regulate, forestall, or prevent the speech of opponents outside the 
government.  The Brandenburg paradigm erects a solid wall between 
the public and private sectors in the sense that there are very differ-
ent constitutional rules governing what the government itself is al-
lowed to do or say on its own behalf as opposed to what the govern-
ment is allowed to impose on the expression of private actors. 
Justice Jackson’s famous axiom aptly describes the Brandenburg 
paradigm’s mandate regarding how the government should view the 
private sector:  “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constel-
lation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opin-
ion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”38  
Several things are notable about this famous quote.  First of all, it 
predated Brandenburg by several decades.  Thus, the notion that the 
government is precluded from prescribing “good” ideas and punish-
ing the utterance of “bad” ideas has been with us in First Amendment 
jurisprudence for a very long time.  Secondly, Justice Jackson does 
not limit his protection of speech to ideas that are overtly political.  
His concept of protected opinions includes “politics, nationalism, re-
ligion, or other matters of opinion.”  In other words, any topic on 
which people might have an opinion is covered by the First Amend-
ment.  Along the same lines, the Court greatly expanded the range of 
topics included in the category of constitutionally protected advocacy 
long before Brandenburg put teeth into the constitutional rules gov-
erning advocacy.39
The third significant aspect of Justice Jackson’s statement of con-
stitutionally mandated agnosticism is that it does not contain an es-
cape clause for the government, such as the notion that the govern-
 38 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 39 See Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp., 360 U.S. at 689. 
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ment may regulate ideas because they are immoral, socially useless, or 
perceived as dangerous by representatives of the status quo.  All ideas 
are protected—not just the safe or morally benign ones.  Likewise, 
there is no room for the sort of cost-benefit analysis that is sometimes 
proposed as a way of melding considerations of civil liberties with the 
need for various forms of social and economic regulation.40  Justice 
Jackson’s statement therefore dovetails with the central conception of 
the Brandenburg paradigm that, in the absence of proof that speech 
will lead directly to a concrete, identifiable harm of the sort that the 
government may redress, speech may not be regulated at all. 
The notion that the government must remain agnostic when ex-
ercising its legal authority regarding the speech of its citizens is now 
deeply embedded within the First Amendment jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court and is often stated as a general proposition that ap-
plies across the board of First Amendment concerns.  In one varia-
tion on this theme, Justice Kennedy once wrote for the Court that 
“[v]iewpoint discrimination is . . . an egregious form of content dis-
crimination.  The government must abstain from regulating speech 
when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective 
of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”41  This proposition 
is often combined with other First Amendment mechanisms, such as 
the overbreadth doctrine, to overturn statutes that on their face seem 
to distinguish between the government’s favorite ideas and other 
ideas that the government seeks to disparage.42
In short, the first component of the Brandenburg paradigm is a po-
tent tool in restricting those who control the government from using 
the government’s coercive authority to direct public debate in a di-
rection that they favor.  In easy cases, especially those involving the 
 40 For different versions of the cost/benefit argument, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY 
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 28–51 (1993) (arguing that speech should be regu-
lated under much the same standard that applies to other targets of government regula-
tion); R. H. Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment:  The Market for Goods and the Market 
for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (1974) (arguing that the market for speech and the mar-
ket for commercial goods should be governed by the same analysis); Richard A. Posner, 
Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1986) (setting forth an eco-
nomic model for the regulation of free speech); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus 
Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737 (2002) (arguing that a prag-
matic cost-benefit analysis is consistent with First Amendment history, theory, and text) 
 41 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (striking down student activity funding regime at a public uni-
versity that discriminated against some student groups based on the subject matter of 
their speech). 
 42 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a St. Paul, Minnesota 
hate speech ordinance on the ground that it discriminated on the basis of both content 
and viewpoint). 
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overt regulation of political speech, this is how Brandenburg is typically 
used.  Outside the realm of political speech, however, in recent years 
the Court has become far more reluctant to force the government to 
refrain from regulating the marketplace of ideas.  Part II will explore 
several instances of this phenomenon. 
2.  The Harm Principle 
Under the first component of the Brandenburg paradigm, the gov-
ernment is generally prohibited from using its regulatory authority to 
dictate the terms or content of public debate about both political and 
nonpolitical matters.  Even when dealing with the most highly pro-
tected forms of speech, however, there is an exception to the general 
mandate of government agnosticism.  The exception applies when 
the speech in question threatens to cause an immediate, concrete, 
and identifiable harm to property, institutions, or individuals other 
than the speaker.  Thus, at least with regard to the regulation of 
speech, the Court has effectively adopted a version of John Stuart 
Mill’s harm principle:  “the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”43  Louis Brandeis, one 
of the key progenitors of what has become the Brandenburg paradigm, 
tightened the Millian harm principle even further by prohibiting the 
government from regulating speech that causes only minor harms:  
“There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be pre-
vented is a serious one.”44
In addition to prohibiting the government from regulating any-
thing but harmful speech, the Court has also been rigorous in limit-
ing the definition of the concept of “harm.”  In the political advocacy 
realm, the Court has strictly limited the government to regulating on-
ly speech that leads to concrete, and probably only physical, harms.  
In all three of the Court’s main political speech cases, the Court fo-
cused on the harm of physical violence or public disorder.45  These 
 43 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1985) 
(1859). 
 44 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 45 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (“When [emotional ap-
peals to unity and action in a common cause] do not incite lawless action, they must be 
regarded as protected speech.”); Hess v. Indiana , 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam) 
(maintaining that in the absence of evidence that the speaker’s words “were intended to 
produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words could not be punished by 
the State on the ground that they had a ‘tendency to lead to violence’”); Brandenburg v. 
 
984 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
 
cases and their predecessors make clear that no abstract, ideological, 
emotional, or otherwise intangible harms would suffice to justify the 
regulation of advocacy.  As Justice Harlan once famously noted, 
“[t]he essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is ad-
dressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather 
than merely to believe in something.”46
In these cases the Court has protected advocates ranging from 
communists to Ku Klux Klansmen.  The facts in these cases indicate 
that even the prospect that the speaker will lead his or her listeners to 
believe in a set of ideas that are odious, extremist, or far outside the 
mainstream is insufficient to justify government regulation of speech.  
Thus, within the Brandenburg paradigm the harm principle is closely 
linked to the agnosticism mandate.  By limiting the range of harms 
that the government can use to justify regulating speech, the Court 
effectively insulates against government coercion the full range of in-
dividual perspectives about the world.  Thus, in the absence of proof 
that the speaker is directly inciting violence or other illegal activity, 
the government is not allowed to use its legal authority in a commu-
nitarian fashion to construct a preferred set of social mores to which 
its citizens must give obeisance.  The government is not allowed to 
force its citizens to pledge allegiance to itself because, in the realm of 
the Brandenburg paradigm, opposition to the government is not a le-
gally cognizable harm. 
3.  The Imminence Requirement 
The imminence requirement further limits the government’s abil-
ity to regulate radical political advocacy by stipulating that the speak-
er being regulated must not only create a harm, but an imminent 
harm.  Recall the language in Brandenburg:  proscribable advocacy 
must be “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action.”47  The imminence re-
quirement stems back to debates within the Court after World War I 
over the prosecutions of socialist and anarchist opponents of the war.  
The position of the Court’s majority at the time was summarized by 
Justice Sanford in his majority opinion in Gitlow v. New York.48  Justice 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (prohibiting the government from punishing advocacy of 
force or violence unless “such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
 46 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324–25 (1957). 
 47 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added). 
 48 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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Sanford argued that the government should be allowed to punish 
radical political advocacy even when “the effect of a given utterance 
cannot be accurately foreseen.”49  Justice Sanford’s metaphor for rev-
olution was a firestorm; in his view, the government should be al-
lowed to extinguish the revolutionary spark “without waiting until it 
has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration.”50  Since 
the government did not have to prove that speech being targeted for 
suppression had any immediately cognizable or concrete illegal con-
sequences, this standard had the effect of allowing the government to 
suppress virtually any abstract advocacy that deviated significantly 
from the political status quo. 
Following the lead of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the modern 
Court has resoundingly rejected Justice Sanford’s conception of gov-
ernmental power to regulate radical political advocacy.  Indeed, the 
introduction of an imminence requirement is the major doctrinal in-
novation of Justice Holmes’s famous dissenting opinion in Abrams v. 
United States—an opinion that many years later would contribute a 
great deal to the holding of Brandenburg and would likewise form the 
heart of the Brandenburg paradigm.  The introduction of an immi-
nence requirement was necessary to salvage Holmes’s favored contex-
tual analysis for free-speech protection under the First Amendment.  
In the guise of Holmes’s famous clear and present danger test, the 
contextual analysis had proved virtually worthless in protecting politi-
cal dissidents during times of heightened domestic tensions over the 
war and prejudice against both immigrants and left-wing radicals.51
The importance of the imminence requirement to Holmes is evi-
denced by his phrasing of the requirement in Abrams:  “we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions 
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so 
 49 Id. at 669. 
 50 Id. 
 51 All of the Supreme Court’s early cases in which it applied the clear and present danger 
analysis involved some combination of those two elements.  See Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding the conviction of a member of the Communist Labor Party 
for attending a party convention); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 657–59 (upholding the conviction 
of a member of the Socialist Party for distributing a pamphlet calling for “revolutionary 
mass action”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding convictions of 
five Russian immigrants, self-identified as “anarchists” or “socialists,” for distributing anti-
war circulars); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding the conviction of 
the head of the American Socialist party for giving a speech criticizing American in-
volvement in World War I); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (upholding 
the conviction of a German newspaper editor for publishing editorials against the Ameri-
can involvement in World War I); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (uphold-
ing the conviction of Socialist party activists for distributing antiwar pamphlets). 
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imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and press-
ing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the 
country.”52  As the son of a prominent American poet, and as a writer 
of no small talent himself, it is a measure of the importance of the 
imminence requirement that Holmes used some variation of the 
term three times in one sentence in describing what should be the 
constitutional standard for regulating political speech.  His descrip-
tion of the standard also gives an indication of how imminent a harm 
must be to satisfy the Constitution:  the standard covers the expres-
sion of opinions that are “fraught with death,” and such opinions can 
only be squelched if “an immediate check is required to save the 
country.”  According to Holmes, nothing less than the threat of the 
country’s destruction could justify the suppression of political speech.  
A similar theme can be found in Justice Brandeis’s opinion eight 
years later in Whitney v. California, in which Brandeis articulated a sort 
of time-frame analysis to determine whether the government had sat-
isfied the imminence requirement.  According to Brandeis, “[i]f 
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and falla-
cies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.  Only an emergency 
can justify repression.”53  Both the Holmes and Brandeis formulations 
of the imminence requirement would require the government to 
walk right up to the precipice of social disorder before suppressing 
the speech of its opponents.  The modern Court seems to take these 
formulations to heart.  In Claiborne Hardware, for example, the Court 
protected speech that occurred in the context of ongoing violence, 
noting simply that the violence did not occur immediately following 
the speech.54  In Hess, likewise, the Court protected a speaker who was 
urging the crowd that had already engaged in violence to become 
violent again.55  Brandeis’s time-frame analysis now seems to be a cen-
tral part of modern First Amendment jurisprudence. 
The imminence requirement is not simply a mechanism for en-
forcing the other aspects of the Brandenburg paradigm; it is intricately 
intertwined with the agnosticism mandate.  When he objects to 
Holmes’s immediacy analysis in Gitlow, Justice Sanford approaches 
 52 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 53 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 54 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (“In this case . . . —with 
the possible exception of [one] incident—the acts of violence identified in 1966 occurred 
weeks or months after the April 1, 1966, speech . . . .”). 
 55 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) (overturning the conviction of a 
protester who urged crowd to “take the fucking street later” or “take the fucking street 
again”). 
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the question from the perspective of the government’s right of self-
preservation; according to Justice Sanford, a government should not 
be forced to defer the implementation of self-preservation measures 
until the point at which there is an “imminent and immediate danger 
of its own destruction.”56  Holmes’s response to Justice Sanford’s con-
cern with government self-preservation is to argue that under his 
theory of free speech, no government necessarily deserves to be pre-
served in the face of political opposition.  In Holmes’s more pithy 
phrasing of this point, “[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in 
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant 
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they 
should be given their chance and have their way.”57
If one takes this phrase literally, then the clear impression in read-
ing Holmes’s free-speech opinions is that his own deep-seated politi-
cal skepticism (which some would go so far as to label nihilism58) is so 
strong that he would actually prohibit the government from saving 
itself in times of political crisis.  Whether the modern Court would 
take the same radically skeptical view of governmental power is 
doubtful.  But it does seem clear that the modern Court would ad-
here to Brandeis’s notion that only an emergency would justify the 
suppression or punishment of speech.  It is equally clear that the 
Brandenburg paradigm is permeated with Holmesian skepticism about 
unsupported government claims of political danger.  In the absence 
of concrete facts leading to the clear implication of violence or other 
serious threats to the social order, speech coming within the Branden-
burg paradigm cannot be suppressed by the government. 
4.  The Assertion of High Collective Risk Tolerance 
When the Court settled the debate over the imminence require-
ment in favor of a standard that allows the government to suppress 
speech only in the face of a dire emergency, the Court simultaneously 
adopted a particular perspective about society’s tolerance for political 
risk.  In essence, the Brandenburg paradigm adopts the perspective 
that this society is willing to tolerate significant amounts of social 
turmoil as part of our daily social fabric.  Moreover, according to the 
Brandenburg paradigm, society must tolerate a significant amount of 
 56 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669. 
 57 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 58 See, e.g., David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 
449, 475 (1994) (“Holmes qualifies as a moral nihilist; indeed, he advanced the moral ni-
hilist’s typical reduction of value judgments to tastes and naked preferences . . . .”). 
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speech by those who are recognized as far outside the mainstream of 
society and the “legitimate” political culture.  There is no pretense 
here that we are talking about a marketplace of ideas; no one seri-
ously contends that the Klansmen whose claims were at issue in Bran-
denburg have anything worthwhile to contribute to public debate 
about the significant issues of the day.  Speakers such as the Klans-
men in Brandenburg are little more than pesky nuisances and undif-
ferentiated threats to the public order.  The question, therefore, is at 
what point can society simply shut such people up?  According to the 
Brandenburg paradigm, the answer to that question is that we must 
wait until serious physical disorder occurs; distaste for the speaker or 
vague portensions of where the speaker’s ideas may lead are not suf-
ficient.  One of the central lessons of the Brandenburg paradigm is 
that it prohibits society from acting against speakers on the basis of 
mainstream society’s political squeamishness. 
As with most issues regarding the political speech protections of 
the First Amendment, there are two possible explanations for this 
approach, and both of the explanations stem back to the very differ-
ent personalities of those strange First Amendment bedfellows, 
Holmes and Brandeis.  On the one hand, one could argue, à la Bran-
deis, that the Court has imposed on society such a high level of risk 
tolerance because the Court is forcing us to mimic the brave Framers, 
who in Brandeis’s estimation “did not fear political change [and] did 
not exalt order at the cost of liberty.”59  Or, conversely, one can take 
Justice Holmes’s que sera, sera approach that society must tolerate Bol-
sheviks and other radicals simply because they might just prevail in 
the end and abstract democratic theory requires us to be open to that 
possibility.60  Under this approach, risks are not bad things, because 
they are simply part of history’s cycle. 
Under either the Brandeis or the Holmes rationale, the bottom 
line is that the First Amendment jurisprudence that those Justices set 
in motion creates a constitutional mandate that society must be open 
to all political ideas, including those that advocate destroying the very 
political structure that allows such ideas to be expressed.  As with the 
definition of harm, the Brandenburg paradigm narrows the concep-
tion of risk that society is allowed to use in justifying the application 
of force against political opponents.  Social disorder, political 
change, vociferous debate, the undermining of traditional values, or 
even threatened change in the very nature of government itself are 
 59 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 60 See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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not even counted as cognizable risks of the Brandenburg paradigm.  
The only risk that counts under the Brandenburg paradigm is risk that 
takes the form of immediate, violent social change in a context in 
which debate is forestalled by the rapid development of social disor-
der. 
5.  The Immunization of Speakers for the Actions of Listeners 
The fifth component of the Brandenburg paradigm is more prag-
matic than the previous four components.  The fifth component 
deals with how the Brandenburg paradigm is actually implemented in 
situations where speakers lead listeners to do something antisocial, 
violent, or illegal.  The logical implication of the Brandenburg para-
digm is that speakers are immunized from legal liability for the non-
immediate actions that their speech may have instigated in their lis-
teners.  Of course, this rule may be overcome by evidence of more di-
rect involvement between speakers and listeners (as in a criminal 
conspiracy, for example).  Yet in those cases, more than speech is in-
volved, and therefore the matter is considered outside the Branden-
burg paradigm.  In the absence of such additional evidence, the sim-
ple fact that a speaker gave an inflammatory speech is not a sufficient 
legal justification to hold that speaker accountable for the actions of 
the speaker’s audience. 
The application of this component of the Brandenburg paradigm 
leads to some of the Court’s most controversial decisions.  Two of the 
cases that serve as the foundation for the Brandenburg paradigm pro-
vide examples of this phenomenon.  In Claiborne Hardware, for exam-
ple, the Court protected the speech of someone who instigated a 
crowd in the context of a long-running, acrimonious, and often vio-
lent economic boycott of local businesses.61  The speech was overtly 
threatening to those who violated the boycott, in an atmosphere 
where the boycotters had actually posted individuals outside of local 
businesses to identify those who broke the boycott.62  Likewise, in 
Hess, an individual walked back and forth in front of a roiling crowd.  
Some members of the crowd had most likely already participated in 
violent activities, and he verbally urged them to once again behave 
illegally and possibly violently.63  In both of these cases, it is not diffi-
 61 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 898–906 (1982) (reviewing the 
seven-year history of the dispute between the NAACP and local businesses). 
 62 See id. at 903–04 (discussing the use of store watchers known as “Black Hats”). 
 63 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (per curiam) (although there is no dispute 
that the words used by Hess were either “we’ll take the fucking street later” or “we’ll take 
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cult to arrive at the intuitive conclusion that the lower courts did 
nothing wrong in refusing to protect the speech.  Both situations in-
volved a strong threat of violence, and perhaps even mayhem or 
death.  Both situations involved speakers who seemed to be fully 
aware of the consequences of their speech.  And both situations in-
volved speakers who were using their speech to engage the enemy 
through physical action or violence, not words or intellect. 
Despite these factors, the Court easily found that the First 
Amendment protected the speakers in each instance.  The narrow 
historical rationale for this is easy to discern.  The modern Court is 
extremely reluctant to attribute any crowd’s violent tendencies to a 
speaker in an historical context in which an earlier Court was willing 
to allow the government to imprison (as Holmes put it in Abrams) vir-
tually every “poor and puny anonymit[y]”64 who was caught while ut-
tering an anti-government phrase in public.  The lesson that these 
early cases have taught the modern Court is not just that “[s]trong 
and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in 
purely dulcet phrases,”65 but that if you give the government its head, 
even purely dulcet phrases can sometimes subject opposition presi-
dential candidates to ten years in federal prison.66  Immunizing the 
speaker from responsibility for all non-immediate violent actions 
committed by the speaker’s audience has the effect of removing from 
the government the ability to interpret benign political opposition as 
the incitement of violence. 
Each component of the Brandenburg paradigm reinforces one or 
more of the others.  This particular aspect of the paradigm dovetails 
with the seventh component of the paradigm discussed below:  if the 
government is prohibited from using a speaker’s aggressive phrasing 
and presentation as the instigation of violence, the speaker is freed to 
speak as forcefully as he or she sees fit.  In the Brandenburg paradigm, 
speakers and speakers alone can decide how to phrase their particu-
lar point of view.  The phrase “I respectfully oppose the draft” may 
reflect the same sentiments as “Fuck the draft,”67 but rhetorically 
speaking the two phrases are in different leagues.  Under the Bran-
the fucking street again,” there is some dispute as to whether Hess actually intended to 
incite the crowd). 
 64 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 65 Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928. 
 66 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 217 (1919) (upholding the ten-year prison sen-
tence issued to Socialist Party presidential candidate Eugene V. Debs for giving a cam-
paign speech opposing American involvement in World War I). 
 67 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (overturning the conviction of a man for 
wearing a jacket bearing the inscription “fuck the draft” in a public courthouse). 
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denburg paradigm, each speaker may decide for him or herself how 
much verbal aggression is necessary for the occasion, regardless of 
whether the more aggressive speech may instigate others to act in il-
legal ways. 
6.  The Assumption of Listener Incredulity 
In addition to the lesson that speakers should be allowed to de-
cide for themselves how to cast their ideas, the Court has learned an 
additional lesson from its supine disinclination to protect dissent dur-
ing the World War I era.  This additional lesson has to do, not with 
the rights of speakers, but rather with the responsibilities of listeners.  
The earlier era of First Amendment jurisprudence, during which the 
Court permitted the government to suppress political dissent virtually 
without constitutional constraint, produced several consequences for 
members of the intended audience for the suppressed speakers.  The 
most obvious consequence is that the listeners could not hear par-
ticular ideas and points of view.  Thus, the scope of public debate was 
warped to favor the government’s preferred perspective.  The less ob-
vious consequence is that these cases freed listeners from the respon-
sibility of deciding what to believe and what not to believe and also 
freed them from the obligation to exercise restraint and to obey the 
law in the face of overt entreaties to do otherwise.  Each of these con-
sequences is overtly paternalistic.  During this period, the govern-
ment acted expressly on the belief that individual citizens were inca-
pable of figuring out for themselves what they believed about major 
public controversies of the day and of obeying the law in the face of 
incitements to disobey. 
Paternalism is in general a dangerous precept for a democratic 
government.  All forms of democracy are predicated on notions of 
popular rule; thus, all forms of democratic government assume that 
the people run the government instead of the other way around.  A 
government that engages in paternalistic behavior toward its citizenry 
forsakes the central characteristic necessary for that government to 
be characterized as democratic.  A democratic government obtains its 
legitimacy only through the consent of the governed.  A government 
that engages in paternalistic manipulation of public debate effectively 
seeks to create its own consent by denying its citizens access to politi-
cal options that do not favor (or may even undermine) the current 
regime.  A government that manipulates its own citizenry in this fash-
ion cannot lay claim to democratic legitimacy. 
The Brandenburg paradigm addresses these issues in several ways.  
First, as discussed in the previous Sections, the Brandenburg paradigm 
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protects democratic governments from acceding to their natural in-
clination to err on the side of safety with regard to radical political 
expression.  Under the Brandenburg paradigm, nothing short of an 
immediate threat of violent upheaval or revolution will justify shut-
ting down the speech of the government’s political opponents. 
The second way in which the Brandenburg paradigm addresses 
these issues may be even more important:  implicit in the Brandenburg 
paradigm is an image of a proper democratic citizen.  The paradigm 
imputes to that citizen a certain number of characteristics that are es-
sential to effective participation in a political system governed by the 
First Amendment.  Those characteristics include incredulity, rational-
ity, critical intelligence, insensitivity to political slights, and an under-
standing of the political protocols that accompany an orderly transfer 
of power, leavened with a Jeffersonian awareness68 that orderly politi-
cal processes may ossify to the point that precepts of liberty will com-
pel citizens to overthrow the existing order and begin again.  These 
characteristics effectively transfer from the government to individual 
citizens the responsibility for avoiding the political excesses threat-
ened by radical political and religious ideologues.  The Brandenburg 
paradigm assumes that citizens approach political discourse with an 
attitude of healthy skepticism and that they assume that everything 
said in the political marketplace is half-true, altogether false, or at 
least entirely self-interested.  Likewise, the Brandenburg paradigm’s as-
sumption that citizens will bring to the political marketplace the 
characteristics of rationality and critical intelligence leads to the con-
clusion that citizens are fully capable of detecting snake oil in the 
form of factual claims that are demonstrably untrue.  The Branden-
burg paradigm assumes that citizens are fully capable of dealing with 
the public dissemination of nonsense ranging from Holocaust denial 
to creationism without the government’s protection.  Thus, while 
other constitutional provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause or 
the Establishment Clause may preclude the government itself from 
making such claims, there is no need to regulate the private market 
in the expression of factual nonsense. 
In short, the Brandenburg paradigm transforms the First Amend-
ment into an anti-paternalism clause.  Under Brandenburg, citizens 
 68 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Prudence, indeed, will dic-
tate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient 
Causes . . . . But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the 
same Object, evinces a Design to reduce [the people] under absolute Despotism, it is 
their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for 
their future Security.”). 
Apr. 2010] THE BRANDENBURG PARADIGM 993 
 
 
may need the government’s protection when radical speech turns in-
to a riot, but until that point, citizens are fully capable of taking care 
of themselves. 
7.  Form and Content Are Constitutionally Indistinguishable 
The central precept of the Brandenburg paradigm is that the gov-
ernment is not allowed to censor ideas that contradict the govern-
ment’s official perspective on politics, morality, or other aspects of 
the social ethos.  This precept generates a corollary regarding the 
government’s authority for dictating how ideas may be presented to 
the world.  According to the Brandenburg paradigm, the government 
has no authority to dictate the tone of speech, moderate the force-
fulness of speech, or in any other way force speakers to present their 
ideas in one way rather than another.  To put the matter simply, if 
the First Amendment is viewed through the prism of the Brandenburg 
paradigm, form is indistinguishable from content. 
The primary support for this component of the Brandenburg para-
digm is Cohen v. California,69 a case often viewed as more famous for 
its facts than for what it adds to First Amendment jurisprudence.  Co-
hen is, of course, the case in which an individual was convicted of vio-
lating a California statute prohibiting anyone from disturbing the 
peace by “offensive conduct.”  The individual in question violated the 
statute by wearing around the Los Angeles County Courthouse a 
jacket inscribed with the phrase “Fuck the Draft.”70  The Supreme 
Court overturned the conviction, holding that the inscription was a 
constitutionally protected expression of opinion. 
In cataloguing the various arguments California made for uphold-
ing the conviction, the Court settled on the state’s primary argument, 
which the Court viewed as the state’s desire “to maintain what they 
regard as a suitable level of discourse within the body politic.”71  The 
Court rejected this argument on both practical and theoretical 
grounds.  Practically, the Court could not discern any difference be-
tween this particular epithet and others, leading to Justice Harlan’s 
quip that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”72  The Court’s theo-
retical ground for rejecting the state’s argument was that expressive 
form and content are inextricably intertwined and therefore are both 
protected by the First Amendment.  The Court rejected California’s 
 69 403 U.S.15 (1971). 
 70 Id. at 16. 
 71 Id. at 23. 
 72 Id. at 25. 
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effort to impose decorum rules on public speech by specifically link-
ing a speaker’s choice of words to the speaker’s decision about which 
ideas to express.  Just as the First Amendment does not permit the 
government to dictate the content of the speaker’s ideas, the gov-
ernment also cannot dictate the speaker’s mode of expressing those 
ideas:  “we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid 
particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing 
ideas in the process.  Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the 
censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the 
expression of unpopular views.”73
It is the Court’s willingness to link expressive form and content 
that gives Cohen its continued significance within First Amendment 
jurisprudence and makes the decision one of the cornerstones of the 
Brandenburg paradigm.  But there is another aspect of the Cohen deci-
sion that may be even more significant in terms of the way the Court 
interprets human expression and how that expression must be pro-
tected under the First Amendment.  In one paragraph of his Cohen 
majority opinion, Justice Harlan notes the “dual communicative func-
tion” served by expression:  “[expression] conveys not only ideas ca-
pable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inex-
pressible emotions as well.  In fact, words are often chosen as much 
for their emotive as their cognitive force.”74  These sentiments are 
self-evident to writers of even the most modest talents.  An op-ed arti-
cle expressing in moderate terms the author’s disagreement with the 
country’s current conscription system clearly does not pack the 
punch of the in-your-face declaration “Fuck the Draft.” 
Cohen is significant in that the Court provides First Amendment 
protection for the emotive as well as the cognitive values of speech.  
Without such protection, the government would be given broad au-
thority to inhibit the effectiveness of political speech by purporting to 
target only the manner rather than the content of the speaker’s ex-
pression.  Indeed, without such protection, each of the three primary 
Brandenburg paradigm cases—Brandenburg, Claiborne Hardware, and 
Hess—could have come out the other way.  The speakers in each of 
these cases were communicating their ideas in aggressive, even anti-
social ways, and the same ideas could easily have been communicated 
in much more muted terms.  Under the Brandenburg paradigm, 
speakers are not forced to choose the least frightening or most com-
forting mode of communicating their beliefs.  Likewise, the recogni-
 73 Id. at 26. 
 74 Id. at 26. 
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tion that the emotive value of speech is cognizable under the First 
Amendment extends protection to listeners who may not be primarily 
interested in the cognitive component of expression.  Under the 
Brandenburg paradigm, the nonrational elements of speech are 
equally important as the rational elements. 
The extension of First Amendment protection to the emotive 
elements of expression is one of the ways in which the Brandenburg 
paradigm has obvious implications beyond the realm of political ad-
vocacy.  These implications will be explored below.  For the moment, 
however, it is important to recognize that this aspect of the Branden-
burg paradigm contributes to First Amendment jurisprudence a par-
ticular concept and vision of human beings.  Under this concept, 
human beings are not simply robotic agents, constantly digesting in-
formation and rationally calculating the value of that information.  
Instead, human beings are equally prone to irrational whims and de-
sires that often lead them in directions that the government wishes—
perhaps for very good reasons—they would not go.  Like Plato, who 
feared the antisocial effects of certain music on his rationalist Repub-
lic,75 governments are naturally inclined to fear the nonrational 
forces that often motivate human conduct.  A central point of the 
Brandenburg paradigm is that until antisocial conduct manifests itself, 
antisocial expression is immune from governmental control—
regardless of how emotional or even irrational that expression may 
be. 
8.  Censorship Is a Last Resort 
The eighth component of the Brandenburg paradigm is simply the 
consequence that follows inevitably from the other seven.  It is worth 
 75 See, e.g., Plato’s discussion of music in Protagoras, in which he complains that musicians 
“[p]ossessed by a frantic and unhallowed lust for pleasure, they contaminated laments 
with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs . . . creat[ing] a universal confusion of forms.”  
According to Plato, this led to the popularization of music by way of “the assumption that 
in music there is no such thing as a right and a wrong, the right standard of judgment be-
ing the pleasure given to the hearer, be he high or low.”  Plato’s conclusion is that “music 
has given occasion to a general conceit of universal knowledge and contempt for law, and 
liberty has followed in their train.”  From there, “the next stage of the journey toward lib-
erty will be refusal to submit to the magistrates, and on this will follow emancipation from 
the authority and correction of parents and elders; then, as the goal of the race is ap-
proached, comes the effort to escape obedience to the law, and, when that goal is all but 
reached, contempt for oaths, for the plighted word, and all religion.  The spectacle of the 
Titanic nature of which our old legends speak is re-enacted; man returns to the old con-
dition of a hell of unending misery.”  PLATO, LAWS, bk. III, 700a–701c, in THE COLLECTED 
DIALOGUES OF PLATO INCLUDING THE LETTERS 1294–95 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington 
Cairns eds., Lane Cooper et al. trans., 1961). 
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separating this precept into its own category, however, because in 
some ways this is the heart of the Brandenburg paradigm.  The basic 
idea is encapsulated by the central passage from Justice Brandeis’s 
Whitney concurrence:  “If there be time to expose through discussion 
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of educa-
tion, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.  
Only an emergency can justify repression.”76  Every aspect of the 
Brandenburg paradigm is oriented toward deferring to the intellect of 
the citizenry and preventing the government from getting involved in 
the marketplace of ideas until the government, quite literally, has no 
other option to avoid immediate violent social upheaval or revolu-
tion.  If there is any other alternative to censorship, the Brandenburg 
paradigm requires the government to take it. 
Multiple implications follow from the notion that censorship must 
be used only as a last resort.  Among other things, given the Branden-
burg paradigm’s insistence on an “emergency-only” justification for 
censorship, several avenues are directly foreclosed to the govern-
ment.  First, the Brandenburg paradigm does not permit the govern-
ment to engage in preemptive restrictions on the dissemination of in-
formation or ideas.  The government cannot decide in advance that 
certain ideas (for example, communist or racist ideas) are too dan-
gerous for the public to hear.  Likewise, the government cannot de-
cide in advance that certain information (for example, bomb-making 
information) is too dangerous for the public to hear. 
Second, the Brandenburg paradigm does not permit the courts to 
defer to the political branches in determining whether some ideas or 
information should be suppressed for reasons of public safety or na-
tional security.  It does not matter whether such deference is cast in 
terms of deference to the greater expertise in the political branches 
(as in Justice Sanford’s Gitlow opinion77 or Justice Jackson’s opinion 
in Dennis v. United States78) or as a matter of separation of powers (as 
in Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Dennis79).  In all instances, the 
 76 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 77 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925) (reviewing a New York state syndicalism 
statute and concluding that “[e]very presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity 
of the statute” (citation omitted)). 
 78 341 U.S. 494, 568–69 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that existing First 
Amendment standards should be applied only to cases involving isolated instances of 
speech and “trivialities,” and that the Court should not “hold our Government captive in 
a judge-made verbal trap” in the face of “a well-organized, nation-wide conspiracy”). 
 79 Id. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that courts are ill-suited to judge cases 
involving conflicts between “competing political, economic and social pressures” and 
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Brandenburg paradigm does not permit the political branches to deny 
citizens the right to hear and consider all political options. 
Finally, the Brandenburg paradigm does not permit the govern-
ment to engage in a cost-benefit analysis for different examples of 
speech.  Under the Brandenburg paradigm, the cost-benefit analysis 
has already been made by the Constitution itself.  This system embod-
ies what Holmes once characterized as an “experiment,” through 
which we “wager our salvation”80 on the notion that people will have 
enough common sense to sort out for themselves the good informa-
tion and ideas from the bad.  But this wager is not as cavalier as it may 
at first seem.  It is based on a theoretical approach to government 
that is informed by Holmes’s particularly jaded perspective toward all 
collective human action.  The Brandenburg paradigm rejects a cost-
benefit analysis for speech because the very terms “cost” and “benefit” 
are tendentious.  If the government is allowed to make such an analy-
sis in order to decide whether to regulate speech, it will always do so 
for the benefit of those who control the government.  Charter mem-
bers of the status quo can be counted on to see plenty of costs but no 
benefits in expression that proposes to upset the status quo.  For this 
reason, the Brandenburg paradigm does not permit the status quo to 
decide its own fate.  This wager on popular control may result not 
only in “verbal cacophony,”81 but also violent social or political up-
heaval.  As Holmes once noted, as long as the First Amendment “ex-
periment” is in the Constitution, the government is not allowed to 
prevent the dissemination of opinions that we “loathe and believe to 
be fraught with death,”82 unless the country’s very existence is at 
stake.  That, in its purest essence, is the Brandenburg paradigm. 
B.  The Brandenburg Paradigm and the Democratic Citizen 
The Brandenburg paradigm has its origins in the Court’s political 
speech cases, but the paradigm has implications that range far be-
yond politics.  The Brandenburg paradigm is not just a series of rules 
about regulating political policy discussions, but rather comprises an 
entire worldview about people and how they relate to each other and 
their government.  This worldview incorporates models of both gov-
ernments and citizens that are directly relevant to government regu-
concluding that “[p]rimary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the 
situation before us of necessity belongs to the Congress”). 
 80 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 81 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
 82 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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lation of all forms of ideas and images that get communicated be-
tween human beings.  The Brandenburg paradigm’s model of gov-
ernment posits an entity that is strong enough to advance the policy 
preferences of the political majority, but is also constrained by the 
requirement that neither the new majority’s preferences nor the gov-
ernment that enforces them can be viewed as unassailable.  Under 
such a system, all policy arrangements and political details will be 
considered impermanent, and all governments will come with an im-
plicit expiration date. 
Most importantly with regard to the application of the Branden-
burg paradigm beyond political speech, neither a particular govern-
ment policy nor the existence of the government itself nor the prin-
ciples that the government enshrines can be considered sacrosanct.  
It says something significant about a government that the document 
constituting that government allows the government’s flag to be 
burned83 and allows citizens to refuse to pledge allegiance to that 
government.84  In many ways this is simply the codification of basic 
democratic theory:  the government is constituted by the citizenry, 
whose members are existentially independent from the government.  
In the context of the First Amendment, these precepts have very spe-
cific consequences for all government regulation of speech under-
taken to advance a particular governmental perspective on reality—
even if that perspective cannot be characterized technically as “politi-
cal.” 
In contrast to the Brandenburg paradigm’s perspective on the gov-
ernment, the paradigm contains two complementary but somewhat 
different views of the model citizen, depending upon whether one 
emphasizes the optimistic or pessimistic underpinnings of the Bran-
denburg paradigm.  The optimistic version of the Brandenburg para-
digm’s model of the citizen draws upon the observations in 
Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence85 and posits a rational person capable 
of applying critical intelligence to the surrounding world without re-
lying on the crutch of an intermediary institution such as the gov-
ernment to filter out dangerous or harmful information or ideas.  
 83 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318–19 (1990) (holding unconstitutional a 
federal statute criminalizing the burning of an American flag); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 406–410, 420 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a state statute criminalizing the burn-
ing of an American flag). 
 84 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding unconstitu-
tional a state law requiring citizens to pledge allegiance to the flag). 
 85 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (describing 
free speech as the “means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth” 
among free citizens). 
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This model citizen is informed and educated and fully capable of 
sorting out truth from falsehood, and therefore is unlikely to be 
duped by speakers seeking to lead citizens into illegal activity or other 
temptations. 
In contrast, the pessimistic view of the model citizen under the 
Brandenburg paradigm is not as flattering toward that citizen.  The 
pessimistic view assumes nothing about either the intelligence or the 
perspicacity of the model citizen.  Thus, it is a view that takes citizens 
as they come—that is, as deeply flawed—and asserts the radically po-
pulist proposition that citizens have the right to adopt stupid or mis-
guided ideas as their own.  The pessimistic view makes no claims 
about speech improving the lives of the citizens, nor does it claim 
that free speech will necessarily educate or inform the populace.  
Rather, the pessimistic view takes to heart the agnosticism built into 
the First Amendment and uses that agnosticism to challenge the very 
idea that there should be a “model” citizen.  Indeed, the very idea of 
a “model” citizen smacks of the kind of paternalism that the Branden-
burg paradigm renounces.  According to the pessimistic view of the 
citizen under the Brandenburg paradigm, citizens can think what they 
want and be who they want, regardless of whether their choices of-
fend their neighbors or distress the government. 
Whether one accepts the optimistic or pessimistic view of the 
model First Amendment citizen, the Brandenburg paradigm operates 
the same.  Under both the optimistic and pessimistic views, the op-
erative term for implementing the Brandenburg paradigm’s scheme of 
constitutional speech regulation is “emergency.”  As explained in the 
previous Section, if there is no emergency—defined as a situation in 
which there is no time for counter-speech—there is no cause for gov-
ernment intervention in the speech market.  Likewise, if an example 
of speech does not threaten an immediate, particularized, concrete 
harm, then that speech cannot be regulated at all.  Beyond the me-
chanics of how the Brandenburg paradigm allows the government to 
regulate speech, however, the Brandenburg paradigm’s views of both 
the government and the citizenry have broad implications for the ba-
sic objectives of government itself.  Under the Brandenburg paradigm, 
government does not exist to provide moral or civic education to the 
citizenry; it does not exist to uplift its citizens spiritually (a point rein-
forced by the existence of the Establishment Clause within the First 
Amendment); and it is not there to protect them from thinking bad 
thoughts or reading bad books or watching bad movies.  While the 
Brandenburg paradigm would recognize that the protection of health 
and the prevention of harm are legitimate government functions, the 
thrust of the paradigm would emphasize that in order to stay within 
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its proper mandate, the government must focus on physical health 
and harms, not mental or spiritual ones. 
II.  NONPOLITICAL SPEECH AND THE FLIGHT FROM BRANDENBURG 
Much of what has been said in the first portion of this Article is in-
tended to establish the breadth and depth of the Brandenburg para-
digm within the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  
This material is a prelude to a discussion of one of the central puzzles 
of First Amendment jurisprudence, which will be the focus of the re-
mainder of this Article.  The puzzle is this:  Why, given the Court’s 
continued allegiance to the comprehensively speech-protective the-
ory of the First Amendment embodied in the Brandenburg paradigm, 
does the Court so often honor that theory in the breach by articulat-
ing far less speech-protective rules to govern areas of speech that do 
not fit into the narrow confines of the political advocacy category?  As 
noted at the beginning of this Article, the Court has created a pleth-
ora of speech categories other than political advocacy.  The Court has 
applied to those alternative speech categories distinctive sets of rules 
that give the government far more leeway to regulate speech than it 
has within the context of the political advocacy category governed by 
the Brandenburg paradigm.  The question is, what aspects of the Bran-
denburg paradigm has the Court decided to relinquish in these alter-
native speech contexts and why? 
Academic commentators have suggested various rationales for 
subdividing the First Amendment, which will be dealt with in the next 
Part.  The Court itself seldom makes a serious effort to justify creating 
multiple different First Amendments, other than to toss out the occa-
sional snide suggestion that “few of us would march our sons and 
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified 
Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our choice.”86  Justice 
Stevens uttered this statement in his majority opinion in a case involv-
ing the zoning of theaters specializing in sexually explicit materials.87  
The statement was part of his response to the claim that the regula-
tion of this type of speech was no different than the regulation of po-
litical speech.  Justice Stevens noted with approval the Court’s fre-
quent citation to Voltaire’s defense of free speech, and “our zealous 
adherence to the principle that the government may not tell the citi-
zen what he may or may not say.”88  He then goes on to say, however, 
 86 Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 63. 
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that “it is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of ex-
pression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the in-
terest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire’s im-
mortal comment.”89  Justice Stevens makes no attempt to justify these 
distinctions beyond repeating the ipse dixit that “every schoolchild can 
understand why”90 we must strongly protect political speech. 
Courts that go beyond simply stating the obvious—that it is “mani-
fest” that political speech receives more protection under the First 
Amendment than other types of speech—usually resort to some 
measure of the “seriousness” of speech.  The more serious the 
speech, the more protection it receives under the First Amendment.  
One example of this phenomenon is a free speech case decided by 
Judge Richard Posner, involving the firing of a male policeman for 
having a casual conversation with a young woman while off duty.91  
One of the ex-policeman’s claims was that his conversation was pro-
tected by the First Amendment.92  Judge Posner disagreed.  In justify-
ing this result, Posner argued that the purpose of the First Amend-
ment “is to protect the market in ideas, broadly understood as the 
public expression of ideas, narratives, concepts, imagery, opinions—
scientific, political, or aesthetic—to an audience whom the speaker 
seeks to inform, edify, or entertain.”93  The First Amendment did not 
protect the ex-policeman in this case, Posner concluded, because 
“[c]asual chit-chat between two persons or otherwise confined to a 
small social group is unrelated, or largely so, to that marketplace.”94  
Posner goes on to argue that the First Amendment is primarily con-
cerned with “the advancement of knowledge, the transformation of 
taste, political change, [and] cultural expression.”95
This assessment of the difference between serious, high-value 
speech (which is highly protected by the Constitution) and trivial, 
low-value speech (which receives little or no constitutional protec-
tion) is consistent with many of the things that the Supreme Court 
has said over the years when dealing with the regulation of speech 
outside the political advocacy area.  It hardly needs emphasizing that 
this is an exceedingly elitist notion of free speech.  According to this 
theory, the First Amendment protects speech that appeals to indi-
 89 Id. at 70. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1249 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 92 Id. at 1250. 
 93 Id. at 1251 (citation omitted). 
 94 Id. at 1251. 
 95 Id. 
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viduals who are highly educated, culturally sophisticated, or politi-
cally engaged, and does not protect the speech that everyday people 
engage in while living their daily lives. 
Discussions of the high-value/low-value distinction sometimes 
combine the notion of seriousness with the perception of moral recti-
tude.  In the Court’s nude-dancing cases, for example, the Court al-
lowed the government to prohibit total nudity among dancers whose 
express intention was to sexually arouse the audience, but did so us-
ing an analysis that would presumably forbid the government from 
applying the same total ban on nudity to those engaged in “serious” 
theatrical productions.96  In the Court’s most recent decision uphold-
ing a government prohibition of nude dancing, the plurality adopted 
a “secondary-effects” analysis, noting that “the ordinance prohibiting 
public nudity is aimed at combating crime and other negative secon-
dary effects caused by the presence of adult entertainment establish-
ments.”97  The Court adopted this analysis from Justice Souter’s con-
curring opinion in the Court’s previous nude-dancing case.  In his 
discussion of the secondary-effects analysis in that case, Justice Souter 
noted that: 
[T]he secondary effects rationale on which I rely here would be open to 
question if the State were to seek to enforce the statute by barring ex-
pressive nudity in classes of productions that could not readily be analo-
gized to . . . adult films . . . . It is difficult to see, for example, how the en-
forcement of Indiana’s statute against nudity in a production of “Hair” or 
“Equus” somewhere other than an “adult” theater would further the 
State’s interest in avoiding harmful secondary effects . . . .98
This analysis in effect creates two different types of expressive nudity.  
The first type is explicitly erotic and is performed in venues that are 
somewhat off the beaten track for the good, solid, suburban citizen.  
The second type cloaks its eroticism in the soothing particulars of the 
legitimate theater, which is usually performed in a space located in 
one of the nicer sections of town. 
It is possible to view the dichotomy the Court draws between 
“good” eroticism and “bad” eroticism in several ways.  One possibility 
is that the Court is distinguishing between the types of people who go 
to see the “bad” types of erotic dancing and those who go to legiti-
mate theater with erotic elements, in much the same way that earlier 
 96 See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296–302 (2000) (O’Connor, J., plurality opin-
ion) (upholding the application of the city’s public indecency ordinance to prohibit 
nude erotic dancing); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568–72 (1991) (uphold-
ing the application of Indiana’s public indecency statute to expressive nudity). 
 97 Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 291. 
 98 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 585 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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courts defined the general obscenity standard with the specific pur-
pose of denying erotic materials to those who are especially suscepti-
ble to their influence—i.e., the lower classes.99  A second possibility is 
that the Court is simply distinguishing between different types of re-
sponses elicited by the expression in question.  Under this alternative, 
if the expressive nudity is used in a context that generates serious 
thought and contemplation, then the speech is protected.  Con-
versely, if the expressive nudity is used in a context that generates sa-
lacious feelings and immoral sexual urges, then the expression is not 
protected.  Yet a third possibility is that the Court is really serious 
about its secondary effects explanation.  Admittedly, it is difficult to 
take the secondary effects rationale seriously, given the breadth and 
background of most of the statutes involved in these cases and the 
way the Court has applied the secondary effects doctrine to the stat-
utes.  As for the statutes, the very fact that they ban nudity altogether 
instead of focusing on the effects that the statutes are purportedly de-
signed to address suggests that the statutes really target the nudity 
rather than the criminal effects.  As for the secondary effects doc-
trine, the fact that the Court does not require local governments to 
prove secondary effects before banning speech altogether100 suggests 
that the Court is not particularly concerned with criminal activity at 
all. 
Any of these possibilities could explain the Court’s action in the 
nude-dancing cases.  What is significant, however, is that all of these 
explanations are inconsistent with various aspects of the Brandenburg 
paradigm.  Distinguishing between the different audiences of “bad” 
nude dancing and “good” theatrical nudity, for example, is deeply in-
consistent with the egalitarian underpinnings of the Brandenburg pa-
radigm.  Under the Brandenburg paradigm, the state has no role what-
soever in paternalistically deciding that some people are fit to hear or 
see particular expression while others are not.  Under Brandenburg, 
the state is allowed to punish criminal behavior, but it is not allowed 
to identify those whom it thinks will become criminals. 
As for the possibility that in permitting the regulation of nude 
dancing the Court was distinguishing between pure eroticism and the 
 99 See Regina v. Hicklin, (1868) 3 L.R.Q.B. 360, 371 (defining as legally proscribable obscen-
ity material whose tendency is to “deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to 
such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall”). 
100 In the Court’s secondary effects cases municipalities seeking to regulate speech on the 
basis of secondary effects have been allowed to rely on evidence that is merely “reasonably 
believed to be relevant” to the secondary effects issue.  City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
ters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986).  The Court therefore does not require municipalities to 
produce definitive proof that specific speech will cause specific secondary effects. 
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use of erotic symbols to advance a less sensuous and more rational in-
tellectual project, this too is inconsistent with the basic elements of 
the Brandenburg paradigm.  Under the Brandenburg paradigm, the 
government is not allowed to distinguish between good thoughts and 
bad thoughts, nor is it allowed to use its regulatory powers to favor 
thought that is socially useful versus thought that runs contrary to so-
ciety’s prevailing mores.  Citizens may consider for themselves the 
value of all ideas and conceptions of the universe—no matter where 
those ideas lead and regardless of the form in which those ideas get 
packaged. 
Finally, perhaps the most deeply flawed explanation for the 
Court’s nude-dancing cases is the Court’s suggestion that it is permit-
ting cities to ban nude dancing because the dancing might attract an-
tisocial or illegal activities.  This explanation flies in the face of sev-
eral different aspects of the Brandenburg paradigm.  Since the Court 
does not require local governments to prove harm before regulating 
the speech, the Court’s approach violates the Brandenburg harm prin-
ciple.  Likewise, since local governments are allowed to regulate in 
advance of any real problem, the Court’s approach violates the Bran-
denburg immediacy requirement.  By the same token, the Court vio-
lates another precept of Brandenburg by allowing local governments to 
take an extremely risk-averse attitude toward speech that powerful 
elements of the community do not like and which may attract crimi-
nal activity.  Finally, by silencing the speaker in order to control po-
tential listeners who may come to hear what the speaker has to say (or 
see the speaker’s expression), the Court has violated one of the cen-
tral components of the Brandenburg paradigm by shifting the respon-
sibility for potential lawbreaking from the lawbreaker to the speaker. 
What is one to make of the Court’s willingness to virtually ignore 
several of the most important aspects of its own First Amendment ju-
risprudence in a case whose outcome depends entirely on the appli-
cation of First Amendment principles?  In the absence of a compre-
hensive explanation by the Court itself, it is left to outside observers 
to speculate about the nature of the conceptual differences between 
types of speech that drive members of the Court essentially to create a 
multitude of different First Amendments—one very protective First 
Amendment for political speech and advocacy, and a series of other, 
often far less protective First Amendments for a series of other types 
of speech.  The question is whether one can make a plausible case for 
the existence of conceptual differences between the different types of 
speech identified by the Court, and if these conceptual differences do 
exist, whether they justify protecting speech within nonpolitical cate-
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gories much less rigorously than the Court is willing to protect speech 
advocating illegal activity or the violent overthrow of the government. 
This question can best be addressed by looking at the First 
Amendment jurisprudence applicable to several specific categories of 
speech that the Court has created outside the advocacy of political 
speech area.  The next four Sections undertake this task by looking at 
four specific categories of nonpolitical speech regulation.  The first 
two categories involve so-called “teaching speech” and “true threats.”  
These two categories are important because they are closely related to 
political speech and yet may not receive anything close to the level of 
protection granted traditional advocacy.  The third category ad-
dressed below involves sexually explicit speech.  As noted above in 
the discussion of the Court’s nude-dancing cases, the Court has de-
vised a series of jurisprudential mechanisms to avoid granting protec-
tion to this type of speech.  This is true even though government 
regulation of sexually explicit speech raises the very question of col-
lective moral regulation that lies at the heart of the Brandenburg para-
digm mandate that the government regulation of speech must always 
remain content and viewpoint neutral.  The fourth category of 
speech considered below involves student speech in public schools.  
Speech within this category raises the issue of whether particular cir-
cumstances justify the sort of government regulation that would be 
illegitimate in the broader world. 
A.  “True Threats” and Intimidation:  The Partitioning of Political Speech 
The category of speech labeled “true threats” is a bit of a puzzle.  
The category clearly exists, having been created by the Supreme 
Court nearly forty years ago as a constitutional gloss on the federal 
statute criminalizing threats against the President,101 but the Court 
has never defined the exact parameters of the “true threat.”  Instead, 
the Supreme Court has left to lower courts the task of filling in the 
details of the category, a task that lower courts have performed in-
consistently and sometimes in virtually total disregard for the usual 
constitutional limits on government regulation of speech. 
This is especially disturbing given the fact that many of the opin-
ions raising the true threats issue involve speech of a political nature.  
Indeed, the case that created the true threats category itself involved 
political speech—an anti-Vietnam War speech in which the Court 
characterized the speaker as having engaged in “political hyperbole” 
101 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (establishing true 
threats as a distinct category in Supreme Court jurisprudence). 
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against the President rather than a “true threat.”102  The Court went 
out of its way to emphasize that speech in the political arena is “often 
vituperative, abusive, and inexact.”103  The Court would make a simi-
lar point over a decade later in Claiborne Hardware when it would ex-
tend the protection of Brandenburg to a speaker using aggressively 
threatening language in a context where actions similar to those 
threatened had already been carried out.104  The Court effectively 
subsumed threats into the general range of vociferous political dis-
course.  Threats such as promises to “discipline” those who violated 
an economic boycott105 were transformed by the Court into “emo-
tionally charged rhetoric,” “impassioned plea[s],” “strong language,” 
and “spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a 
common cause.”106  In other words, even speech that overtly takes the 
form of a threat is not a constitutionally unprotected “true threat” so 
long as the atmosphere in which the threat is uttered is such that it is 
merely a part of aggressive political discourse. 
If Watts and Claiborne Hardware were the only decisions dealing 
with the concept of the true threat, then we would still be unclear 
what a true threat is, but at least we would have some assurance that 
the concept of a true threat could not be enforced in a way that 
would limit political discourse.  Unfortunately, these two cases are not 
the only word on the subject.  The Court has also addressed the con-
cept of the true threat in a political context on one other occasion, in 
a decision that confuses much more than it clarifies.  In Virginia v. 
Black,107 the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute making it a 
crime to burn a cross in any public place with the intent of intimidat-
ing any person or group.  The case involved three defendants.  Two 
of the defendants had been convicted under the Virginia statute for 
burning a cross on the lawn of a next-door neighbor.108  The third de-
fendant had been convicted under the Virginia statute for burning a 
cross as part of a Ku Klux Klan rally, which was held in a private field 
and attended only by Klan followers.109
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (overturning on Brandenburg 
grounds a civil damages award against the NAACP and its leaders that was based on 
speeches threatening local residents to honor an NAACP boycott of white businesses). 
105 Id. at 902. 
106 Id. at 928. 
107 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
108 Id. at 350. 
109 Id. at 348–49. 
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Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court’s majority in Virginia v. 
Black is both confused and confusing.  In many ways, Justice 
O’Connor wrote two separate opinions.  One of these opinions sug-
gests that there is an entirely separate category of First Amendment 
jurisprudence involving “intimidating” speech.  To bolster this posi-
tion, O’Connor begins her opinion in Black with a long description of 
the history of the violent activities of the Ku Klux Klan, noting that 
“the Klan used cross burnings as a tool of intimidation and a threat of 
impending violence.”110  This history suggests that burning crosses 
communicate a distinctive message that makes them especially sus-
ceptible to government regulation, which Justice O’Connor confirms 
later in the opinion.  “The First Amendment permits Virginia to out-
law cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burn-
ing a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation.”111  Thus, in 
this part of Justice O’Connor’s Black opinion, it seems that she is em-
bracing the notion that states can outlaw particular political symbols 
if those political symbols have a violent history, or (to put the matter 
in the worst First Amendment light) if the symbols are associated with 
highly unpopular political groups and are especially effective at 
communicating the views of those groups.  Needless to say, this prop-
osition directly treads on Brandenburg’s turf and seems to violate vir-
tually every one of the elements of the Brandenburg paradigm. 
The disconcerting implication that in Black the Court intended to 
revisit certain parts of Brandenburg is ameliorated to some extent by 
the other half of Justice O’Connor’s schizophrenic Black opinion.  
Having gone to great lengths in the first part of her opinion to estab-
lish that cross-burning is an especially intimidating symbol that is wor-
thy of state regulation for that very reason, Justice O’Connor then 
turns to the second part of her opinion in which she takes away from 
the state much of the authority she has just granted.  In the second 
part of Justice O’Connor’s Black opinion, she treats intimidating 
speech as merely a subset of the true threat.  “Intimidation in the 
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, 
where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with 
the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”112  
She then goes on to hold unconstitutional the provision of the Vir-
ginia cross-burning statute that made burning a cross prima facie evi-
dence of an intent to intimidate.113  As a result, the Court overturned 
110 Id. at 354. 
111 Id. at 363. 
112 Id. at 360. 
113 Id. at 363–67. 
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the conviction of the third defendant in Black on the ground that his 
speech was entirely political and therefore could not legitimately be 
construed as intimidation or a true threat.  The other two defen-
dants’ cases were remanded for reconsideration by the state courts 
under the Virginia statute denuded of the prima facie evidence provi-
sion. 
There are many problems with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in 
Black.  These problems stem from the internal contradictions in the 
opinion.  On one hand, Justice O’Connor approves of the state sin-
gling out cross burning as an especially intimidating form of speech.  
On the other hand, at other points in the opinion, Justice O’Connor 
chides the state for subjecting to criminal punishment someone who 
is using the burning cross as nothing more than “a statement of ide-
ology, a symbol of group solidarity.”114  Having said that, however, Jus-
tice O’Connor then permits the state to single out threats using burn-
ing crosses for greater punishment than threats in general.  “Instead 
of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regu-
late this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning’s 
long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence.”115  But 
if this is true, then why, given the Court’s own recognition of “cross 
burning’s long and pernicious history as a signal of impending vio-
lence,”116 does O’Connor turn around and prohibit the state from 
prosecuting any and all evidence of cross-burning?  After all, in light 
of the Court’s own historical discussion, the burning cross seems to 
have little message beyond “signal[ing] impending violence,” which is 
hardly the stuff of ordinary political discourse. 
Aside from these contradictions, perhaps the biggest problem 
with the Court’s opinion in Black is that it once again demonstrates 
the Court’s unwillingness to define the parameters of the true threat 
category of speech.  Because of this unwillingness, the category of 
true threats has been defined largely by lower-court opinions.  Unfor-
tunately, these opinions go in a range of different directions, from 
providing almost Brandenburg-style protection of threatening speech 
to providing virtually no protection at all.  Indeed, the two most 
prominent true threats decisions in the lower courts operate at oppo-
site ends of the free speech continuum—the Second Circuit’s opin-
ion in United States v. Kelner117 at the protective end of the continuum, 
and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Planned Parenthood of the Colum-
114 Id. at 365–66. 
115 Id. at 363. 
116 Id. 
117 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976). 
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bia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists118 at the oppo-
site, unprotective end of the continuum. 
Kelner is one of the most frequently cited true threats opinions.  
The case involved statements made by members of the Jewish De-
fense League (the JDL) against Yasser Arafat of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (the PLO), on the occasion of Arafat’s visit to New 
York to address the United Nations General Assembly.119  During a 
televised news conference, Kelner, a member of the JDL, explicitly 
threatened to kill Arafat and purported to have the killing planned 
“in detail.”120  Kelner was convicted under the federal threats statute 
and, on appeal, argued that this conviction was improper because he 
was merely engaged in political speech intended to show that Jews 
would defend themselves against PLO threats.121  The Second Circuit 
rejected his appeal, but only after articulating a very narrow defini-
tion of true threats:  “So long as the threat on its face and in the cir-
cumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, im-
mediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a 
gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution, the [threats] 
statute may properly be applied.”122  The protective parts of this stan-
dard are the explicitness and imminence requirements.  A conviction 
based on evidence falling short of what Kelner provided the prosecu-
tors in this case—i.e., explicit statements of his intention to maim or 
kill, and effectively naming the date on which the action would take 
place—would fail to satisfy the First Amendment.  Ambiguous or hy-
pothetical threatening statements simply would not pass muster un-
der this standard. 
In contrast to Kelner, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Planned Par-
enthood seems to be from a different First Amendment universe.123  
Like Kelner, Planned Parenthood involved aggressive political speech.  
Specifically, Planned Parenthood involved a website and posters that at-
tacked clinic workers, doctors, and others that participated in or fa-
cilitated abortions.124  The website and posters identified various indi-
viduals as guilty of crimes against humanity and subject to a 
hypothetical future Nuremberg-style trial.125  Four doctors and several 
118 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). 
119 Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1020–21. 
120 Id. at 1021. 
121 Id. at 1021–22. 
122 Id. at 1027. 
123 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 422 
F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1111 (2006). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 952. 
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clinics and abortion-rights organizations brought suit against those 
who devised the website and posters under the federal Freedom of 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act, which permits civil suits against any-
one who by “threat of force . . . intentionally . . . intimidates” some-
one seeking reproductive health services.126  The case was tried before 
a jury in federal court, and the jury awarded the plaintiffs millions of 
dollars in damages, including a total of $108.5 million in punitive 
damages (which were reduced on appeal on due process grounds).127
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument 
that the case should be considered under traditional political speech 
protections and decided instead to treat the claim as falling within 
the court’s true threats jurisprudence.  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
applied the following “objective” standard for what can be considered 
a true threat:  “whether a reasonable person would foresee that the 
statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker com-
municates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or 
assault.”128  Utilizing this standard, the Ninth Circuit upheld the jury 
verdict in Planned Parenthood.  This standard is virtually the polar op-
posite of the standard used by the Second Circuit in Kelner and is so 
lenient as to practically remove the First Amendment from considera-
tion in true threats cases.  As a measure of how lenient the standard 
is, consider that the Ninth Circuit’s “objective” true threat standard 
incorporates none of the three elements of Brandenburg.  The stan-
dard lacks any reference to immediacy, so speech can be treated as a 
true threat without regard to whether the threat will be carried out at 
any point in the near future.  The standard also does not require the 
threat to be explicit, as evidenced by the fact it was applied to uphold 
a threats verdict in a case in which none of the speech in question 
contained any explicit threats.  And finally, the Ninth Circuit re-
nounced any requirement that the speaker intended to threaten the 
victim:  “It is not necessary that the defendant intend to, or be able to 
carry out his threat; the only intent requirement for a true threat is 
that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicate the 
threat.”129
126 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (2006) (providing for civil suits against those who discourage these 
reproductive services through threats or intimidation). 
127 Planned Parenthood, 422 F.3d at 949. 
128 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 
F.3d 1058, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 
1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)) (setting forth one standard for assessing true threats). 
129 Id. at 1075.  Note that some subsequent Ninth Circuit panels considering this issue have 
ruled that under the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Black, “We are . . . bound 
to conclude that speech may be deemed unprotected by the First Amendment as a ‘true 
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A broad definition of the true threats category may greatly cir-
cumscribe the protection of political speech.  Note that with the ex-
ception of the first two defendants in Black, all of the speech involved 
in the true threats cases discussed thus far has been overtly political 
in nature.  Also recall that in two of the three foundational cases in 
the political speech area—Brandenburg and Claiborne Hardware—the 
speech that the Court characterizes as political was in fact overtly 
threatening in nature.130  So discussions of the standards applicable to 
true threats are important because those standards will frequently 
bleed over into the area of political speech. 
Given the close association of political speech and true threats, 
what does the Brandenburg paradigm tell us about the proper stan-
dard that should be applied in the true threats area?  Many of the 
Brandenburg paradigm components can be applied directly to the 
problems raised by true threats.  It is easy and uncontroversial, for 
example, to apply the ideological agnosticism component of the 
Brandenburg paradigm to true threats, in the sense that all of the true 
threats precedents are consistent with the proposition that the gov-
ernment is not permitted to treat speech as a true threat simply be-
cause that speech takes an antagonistic or controversial side of a pub-
lic debate.  Applying the immediacy component of the Brandenburg 
paradigm is equally easy but perhaps more controversial.  The imme-
diacy requirement is what separates the Kelner standard from the 
Ninth Circuit approach in Planned Parenthood.  In Planned Parenthood, 
the court simply takes a reasonable person approach to identifying 
true threats, leaving it to the jury to determine whether a distant 
threat is sufficiently fearsome to warrant legal sanction.  Under the 
Kelner standard, on the other hand, a criminal threats prosecution 
can only be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an immi-
nent threat. 
threat’ only upon proof that the speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat.”  
United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 633 (9th Cir. 2005).  The full Ninth Circuit has not 
yet resolved the issue of whether to use a Planned Parenthood-style objective standard or a 
Cassel-style subjective standard for determining the existence of true threats.  See Fogel v. 
Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (“This circuit has thus far avoided deciding 
whether to use an objective or subjective standard in determining whether there has been 
a ‘true threat.’”). 
130 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982) (during a public speech 
to support an economic boycott of local businesses, speaker asserts that “If we catch any 
of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck”); Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969) (speaker threatens to take “some revengeance” 
against various people and institutions if they continued to “suppress the white, Cauca-
sian race”). 
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Courts that would disagree with the introduction of an immediacy 
requirement for true threats prosecutions are in essence making a 
value judgment about the First Amendment value of speech contain-
ing threatening language.  This is where the clash between existing 
true threats jurisprudence and the Brandenburg paradigm becomes 
most evident.  Phrasing this dispute in terms of the components of 
the Brandenburg paradigm, this clash probably pertains to disagree-
ments over the importance of four different Brandenburg factors:  the 
harm principle, the assumption of high collective risk tolerance, the 
shifting of legal liability from speaker to actor, and the assumption of 
listener incredulity.  Courts that adopt very lenient standards for 
prosecuting true threats implicitly make a series of assumptions that 
are quite different than those made by the Supreme Court in Bran-
denburg and its companion cases. 
Courts that apply a lenient standard to true threats stray from the 
usual Brandenburg requirement that the harm created by proscribed 
speech must be concrete.  In the usual Brandenburg case, feelings of 
unease and even trauma are insufficient to justify legal regulation of 
the renegade speech.131  In the true threats cases, on the other hand, 
protecting the victim from feelings of unease and trauma are pre-
cisely the object of the legal exercise.  None of the true threats cases 
require evidence that the victim of the threat actually changed his or 
her behavior as a result of the threatening speech.  The cases simply 
require that the perception of a threat be reasonable (in the Ninth 
Circuit’s rendition of the standard)132 or (in the more speech-friendly 
Second Circuit rendition of the standard) that the threat be uncondi-
tional and specific enough to justify the conclusion that it may be car-
ried out.133  Although the Second Circuit standard comes close to re-
quiring a Brandenburg-style concrete harm before sanctioning the 
speech, the Ninth Circuit standard simply leaves the matter up to the 
jury—even when the speech in question is highly political in ways that 
131 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“Accordingly a function of free speech 
under our system of government is to invite dispute.  It may indeed best serve its high 
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even stirs people to anger.  Speech is often provocative and challenging.  It 
may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it 
presses for acceptance of an idea.  That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is 
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce 
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public incon-
venience, annoyance, or unrest.” (citations omitted)). 
132 See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074 (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 
F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)) (describing the reasonableness standard). 
133 See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976) (describing the Second 
Circuit’s immediacy analysis for true threats). 
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are indistinguishable from the speech in cases such as Claiborne 
Hardware. 
Along the same lines, a lenient true threat standard such as the 
one adopted by the Ninth Circuit abandons the Brandenburg para-
digm’s assumptions about a high collective tolerance of expressive 
risks.  The Ninth Circuit treats threatening speech as indistinguish-
able from every other tortious or criminal activity, inviting the sort of 
risk-averse balancing between harms and benefits that accompany le-
gal regulation of every other kind of human activity.  Under such a 
system, speech would not be given the favorable treatment over other 
human activities that it is currently afforded under the Brandenburg 
paradigm. 
The explanation for the abandonment of the Brandenburg para-
digm’s mandate of high risk tolerance in true threats cases is the si-
multaneous refusal of courts such as the Ninth Circuit to maintain ei-
ther the Brandenburg paradigm’s shift of legal liability from speaker to 
actor, or the complementary assumption of listener incredulity.  In 
the Ninth Circuit’s Planned Parenthood decision, there is no indication 
anywhere in the record that individuals or groups accused of true 
threats were themselves intending to carry out the threats.134  Instead, 
the Ninth Circuit permitted liability to attach on the theory that the 
defendants’ speech might instigate other unnamed individuals to en-
gage in violent action against the plaintiffs.  If this case were litigated 
as an incitement case, therefore, the speaker would be completely in-
sulated from legal liability, as in Claiborne Hardware.  Likewise, if the 
Brandenburg paradigm’s assumption of the listener incredulity pre-
vailed, plaintiffs could not rely on the suggestion that someone might 
be moved by the defendants’ speech to harm the plaintiffs.  Any such 
suggestion could be rebutted by the Brandenburg paradigm’s assump-
tion that listeners have enough common sense to realize that a 
“Wanted” poster linked to some hypothetical future Nuremberg trial 
of abortion doctors is nothing more than political speech—emotional 
and incendiary political speech perhaps, but political speech none-
theless. 
Cases such as Planned Parenthood illustrate the dangers of the 
Court’s tendency to create one category of highly protected political 
speech, governed by the Brandenburg paradigm, and then a whole se-
ries of alternative categories in which the Brandenburg paradigm ap-
134 See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1075 (“It is not necessary that the defendant intend to, 
or be able to carry out his threat; the only intent requirement for a true threat is that the 
defendant intentionally or knowingly communicate the threat.”). 
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plies very little if at all.  The danger is not simply that in such a system 
nonpolitical speech will receive far less protection than political 
speech.  The more insidious danger is that the lines between the dif-
ferent categories of speech are so amorphous that courts that wish to 
do so can easily shift some examples of political speech into the less-
er-protected categories and thereby avoid the Brandenburg paradigm 
altogether.  In fact, this is exactly what happened in Planned Parent-
hood.  Despite the court’s protestations to the contrary,135 there is little 
to distinguish the speech that was deemed unprotected in Planned 
Parenthood from the speech that the Supreme Court unanimously 
protected in Claiborne Hardware.  Both cases involved speeches con-
taining overtly threatening language, antagonists in emotional and 
sometimes violent political disputes, and contexts in which other an-
tagonists in the disputes had already engaged in violence.  Different 
legal results were possible in the two cases simply because the speech 
in one case was placed in the true threats category and the speech in 
the other case was placed in the advocacy category. 
It makes little sense to allow litigants and courts to manipulate the 
legal result in free speech cases simply by maneuvering the speech in 
question into a different category, but this is an inevitable conse-
quence of creating different standards for closely related types of 
speech.  The real problem is not the existence of the categories 
themselves, but rather the fact that outside the category of political 
advocacy the courts tend to be very reluctant to apply the various 
components of the Brandenburg paradigm.  This reluctance stems 
from the general perception that categories of speech other than po-
litical advocacy involve completely different issues than those raised 
by radical political speech.  A close reading of the true threats cases 
casts doubt upon this perception, however. 
It is relatively simple to apply most of the components of the 
Brandenburg paradigm to threats.  As Kelner demonstrates, the agnos-
ticism, harm principle, and immediacy components of the Branden-
burg paradigm can be integrated into a true threats standard without 
in any way diminishing the government’s ability to address real 
threats to persons or property.  Once these components are incorpo-
rated into the true threats analysis, the collective risk tolerance and 
listener incredulity assumptions of the Brandenburg paradigm follow 
naturally.  The fact is that in its Planned Parenthood decision, the Ninth 
Circuit never satisfactorily explains why the targets of the speech in 
135 See id. 290 at 1073–74 (attempting to distinguish Claiborne Hardware from Planned Parent-
hood). 
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that case should have been more frightened of the threatening 
speech directed at them than the targets of the equally threatening 
speech in Claiborne Hardware.  It could be argued that the speech in 
Claiborne Hardware deserves even less protection than the speech in 
Planned Parenthood.  The speech in Claiborne Hardware took place in a 
small town, where virtually everyone in town was involved in the dis-
pute, where violence similar to that promised in the threatening 
speech had occurred in the immediate past, and where those associ-
ated with the speaker had been directly engaged in the violence.136  
The speech in Planned Parenthood, on the other hand, took place in a 
much more general context (such as the World Wide Web), there 
was no indication that the speakers carried out any of the violence or 
associated with anyone who did, and the speech was much less ex-
plicit than in Claiborne Hardware.  In short, if the holding of Claiborne 
Hardware is right, then the holding of Planned Parenthood is wrong.  
Planned Parenthood misses the central theme of Claiborne Hardware and 
the other cases forming the heart of the Brandenburg paradigm:  in 
general, legal liability for violence should be ascribed to the person 
perpetrating violence, not the person who suggests that violence 
might be a good thing. 
None of this is intended to suggest that the application of the 
Brandenburg paradigm to true threats would fail to take into account 
the specialized circumstances that arise in some threatening situa-
tions.  For example, in cases involving threats spoken publicly (such 
as both Kelner and Planned Parenthood) it makes sense to implement 
the Brandenburg paradigm in true threats cases by applying something 
very close to the standard used in Brandenburg itself—that is, by re-
quiring evidence of an explicit threat, proof of the speaker’s intent 
that the threat is going to be carried out, and some indication of the 
speaker’s (in Kelner’s phrasing) “gravity of purpose and imminent 
prospect of execut[ing the threat].”137  With regard to threats com-
municated privately, however, it would not be inconsistent with the 
Brandenburg paradigm to take into account the changed circum-
stances by altering the legal standard somewhat.  It would not be in-
consistent, for example, to drop the explicitness requirement with 
regard to privately communicated threats.  When received personally 
and privately, a subtle reference can be far more disconcerting than a 
similar reference made in general at a public demonstration.  A tele-
136 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 898–906 (1982) (reviewing the 
seven-year history of the dispute between the NAACP and local businesses). 
137 Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027. 
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phone call made to an individual at home in the middle of the night 
in which the caller says “I know where you live” is far more ominous 
than a similar reference made in Claiborne Hardware to a general au-
dience that the sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at 
night.138
The point here is that the case for the Brandenburg paradigm does 
not require that the precise ingredients of the Brandenburg standard 
must be applied in every alternative category of speech.  The key is 
that the same general assumptions about governmental power and 
personal responsibility that are made when considering legal regula-
tion of political advocacy should be integrated into whatever legal 
standard applies to speech other than advocacy. 
B.  The Regulation of “Teaching Speech” 
Two recent decisions raise the possibility that the courts may cre-
ate within First Amendment jurisprudence a category of so-called 
“teaching speech”—that is, speech that conveys information or 
teaches about how to carry out illegal activity, rather than advocating 
that activity.  Like “true threats,” the teaching speech category is 
closely related to political advocacy, but there are suggestions in the 
case law that the category should be governed by a standard that 
would undermine much of the protection for speech offered by the 
Brandenburg paradigm.  Today there is no opinion by the full Su-
preme Court discussing the proper standard that should be applied 
to teaching speech.  Instead, we have two prominent lower court opi-
nions that resolved the First Amendment issues related to teaching 
speech in diametrically opposed ways; one court would apply Bran-
denburg directly to teaching speech cases while the other would apply 
a standard that falls far short of Brandenburg.  As with the category of 
true threats, the question is whether there is something in the nature 
of the teaching speech category itself that explains why the compo-
nents of the Brandenburg paradigm should not apply to instructional 
or teaching speech. 
The two decisions that have directly addressed the issue of teach-
ing speech provide polar opposite readings of the relevant First 
Amendment concerns.  In its decision in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 
Inc.,139 the Fourth Circuit provides a very narrow approach to the 
138 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 902 (“In that speech . . . Evers stated that boycott viola-
tors would be ‘disciplined’ by their own people and warned that the Sheriff could not 
sleep with boycott violators at night.”). 
139 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998). 
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question whether the First Amendment protects speech of this sort.  
The case involved the book Hit Man:  A Technical Manual for Independ-
ent Contractors.140  The book purported to be a primer on how to be an 
assassin.  The book contained some fairly obvious information, such 
as the need to wear black when conducting a hit at night, the desir-
ability of renting a car instead of driving one’s own to a hit, and the 
advisability of using fake information when checking into a hotel dur-
ing an assignment.141  The book also contains some odd suggestions, 
such as that a hit man might want to dispose of a body by cutting off 
the head, placing a stick of dynamite in the victim’s mouth and 
“blow[ing] the telltale dentition to smithereens.”142
Many of the idiosyncrasies of the book can be explained by its ge-
nesis.  Although the author’s name is listed as “Rex Feral” (Latin for 
“king of the beasts”), the real author is a divorced mother of two who 
had originally written the book as a novel, but was urged by the pub-
lisher to turn it into a “how-to” manual.143  According to a Washington 
Post interview with the author, she obtained most of her information 
on how to be a hit man “from books, television, movies, newspapers, 
police officers, [her] karate instructor, and a good friend who is an 
attorney.”144
Despite the amateurish and at times absurd nature of the informa-
tion in the book, the book was found in the possession of a real hit 
man named James Perry.145  Perry was hired by a man to kill his ex-
wife, son, and the son’s nurse, in order for the man to inherit the 
son’s $2 million settlement for injuries he had received in an acci-
dent.146  The victim’s family sued the book’s publisher, Paladin Press, 
for wrongful death under Virginia state law.147  The Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Rice is the appellate court’s reversal of the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment for the publisher on First Amendment 
grounds. 
There are many strange aspects to both the appeal and the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision, two of which are worth noting here.  First of all, al-
though the Fourth Circuit goes to great lengths to criticize the dan-
gerous information contained in Hit Man, the Court also republishes 
140 Id. at 239. 
141 See id. at 240 (detailing the book’s instructions). 
142 Id. at 238. 
143 David Montgomery, If Books Could Kill, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at F1. 
144 Id. 
145 Rice, 128 F.3d at 239. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 241. 
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large portions of this information in its opinion,148 which is freely 
available on the Fourth Circuit website.149  Second, although Paladin 
Press defended on First Amendment grounds, it also stipulated to all 
three components of the Brandenburg standard.150  Rice should, there-
fore, have been an easy (and short) First Amendment decision.  Even 
applying the most protective version of the First Amendment—that is, 
the Brandenburg standard—the speaker would lose because the 
speaker itself conceded that it had violated that standard. 
Instead of publishing a concise opinion making this point, how-
ever, the Fourth Circuit instead submitted a long and meandering 
opinion detailing why the Brandenburg standard does not apply to in-
stances of teaching or instructional speech.  The court concluded 
that the speech in this case constituted criminal aiding and abetting151 
and treated the speech as “tantamount to legitimately proscribable 
nonexpressive conduct.”152  To reach this result, the court first asserts 
that teaching speech such as the information in the Hit Man is inte-
gral to the ultimate criminal act.153  The court then finely parses the 
language in Brandenburg itself, which seems to contradict the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding in Rice.154  The court’s basic conclusion regarding 
the first point is that the First Amendment does not protect speech 
that uses instructional language, especially when accompanied by lan-
guage encouraging crime.155  The court’s conclusion regarding the 
second point is that the protections offered by Brandenburg do not ex-
tend to “mere teaching,” but rather to “mere abstract teaching”—a 
distinction that touches not only the teaching speech category, but 
also has potential ramifications for any speech that is cast in the form 
of action words rather than cloudy abstractions.  In any event, by the 
end of the Fourth Circuit’s discussion, very little is left of First 
Amendment protection of speech that communicates information or 
instructions that might be used by a reader or listener to commit a 
crime at some point in the indefinite future. 
148 See id. at 235–41. 
149 See id. 
150 Id. at 241–42 n.2. 
151 Id. at 242–43. 
152 Id. at 243. 
153 Id. at 243–44 (discussing the concept of aiding and abetting as it relates to the regulation 
of free speech, and arguing that speech is not protected when it becomes an integral part 
of the ultimate criminal act). 
154 Id. at 248–50, 263–65 (assessing the application of Brandenburg to teaching speech). 
155 Id. at 248 (“[The First Amendment] would not relieve from liability those who would, for 
profit or other motive, intentionally assist and encourage crime and then shamelessly 
seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First Amendment.”). 
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A very different approach to these issues can be seen in the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion in McCoy v. Stewart.156  In some ways this case in-
volved much more troubling speech than in Rice.  Rice involved the 
general dissemination of a book containing non-specialized informa-
tion that could have been obtained (and in fact was obtained by the 
author of the book) from a number of other common sources.  
McCoy, on the other hand, involved the communication of specialized 
knowledge directly to individuals willing and able to use that informa-
tion to do illegal things.  The case involved speech that occurred at a 
party attended by gang members from Arizona and California.157  
During the cookout, the Arizona gang members had a conversation 
with their compatriot from California about how California gangs 
conducted certain gang activities.158  The California gang member 
provided detailed advice about things such as initiation rites, gang 
ejection rituals,159 and “tagging” activities.160  Based on these conversa-
tions, the California gang member was indicted and ultimately con-
victed under an Arizona statute prohibiting the participation in a 
criminal street gang by “[f]urnishing advice or direction in the con-
duct” of the criminal enterprise.161
On an appeal of the defendant’s federal habeas corpus proceed-
ing, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the conviction on 
Brandenburg grounds using a straightforward application of Branden-
burg, Hess, and Claiborne Hardware.162  The court treated the conversa-
tions as indistinguishable from any other incendiary speech that had 
no immediate effect on its listeners.163
The key to the Ninth Circuit’s decision was the absence of imme-
diate concrete consequences stemming from the speech.  The court 
noted that the fact that the speech occurred at a barbecue and a par-
ty “made it unlikely anyone would act on [the speech] imminently.”164  
156 282 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 993 (2002). 
157 Id. at 628. 
158 Id. at 630. 
159 Id. at 630 n.4. 
160 See id. (describing the underlying conviction and the facts that led to it and explaining 
gang practices of “jumping people in” and “jumping people out”). 
161 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(A)(3) (2009) (“A person commits participating in a 
criminal syndicate by: . . . Furnishing advice or direction in the conduct, financing or 
management of a criminal syndicate’s affairs with the intent to promote or further the 
criminal objectives of a criminal syndicate”); see also McCoy, 282 F.3d at 628 (describing 
McCoy’s indictment and conviction). 
162 McCoy, 282 F.3d at 631–33. 
163 Id. at 631 (“If anything, McCoy contends, his speech was advocacy of lawlessness at some 
indefinite future time. . . . The record bears out his assertions.”). 
164 Id. at 631–32. 
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The court also noted that the California gang member’s “advice was 
very general” in the sense that his ideas “were not aimed at any par-
ticular person or any particular time.”165  Likewise, his advice about 
tagging “was given without any recommendation as to how or when to 
place the graffiti.”166  Throughout its discussion, the Ninth Circuit 
considered it irrelevant that the speech being prosecuted contained 
information and advice rather than language advocating action.  Un-
der Brandenburg, the Ninth Circuit suggests, the content of the speech 
does not determine the scope of the government’s authority to si-
lence that speech.167  In cases involving information as well as cases 
involving straight advocacy, the speech must be specific, the speech 
must create an immediate danger of illegal action, and the speech 
must be accompanied by evidence that the speaker intended that the 
illegal action occur.168
Other than providing a nice First Amendment counterpoint to 
the Fourth Circuit decision in Rice, the Ninth Circuit decision in 
McCoy might stand as little more than a routine application of Bran-
denburg were it not for an opinion the case generated in the United 
States Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
McCoy, but Justice Stevens submitted an opinion of his own in con-
junction with the denial.169  Although Justice Stevens is careful not to 
express a point of view on the ultimate outcome of the issue, he 
seems essentially to embrace the same point of view that the Fourth 
Circuit took in Rice—i.e., that Brandenburg (and specifically the immi-
nent harm component of the Brandenburg standard) does not apply at 
all to “speech that performs a teaching function.”170  According to Jus-
tice Stevens, expressive activities such as “oral advice, training exer-
cises, and perhaps the preparation of written materials” in conjunc-
tion with criminal enterprises, “may create significant public danger” 
and therefore may not be covered by the First Amendment rights 
granted to political advocacy under Brandenburg.171
From a free speech perspective, it is disconcerting that a Justice 
often considered friendly to First Amendment concerns (and in fact 
who actually wrote the majority opinion in Claiborne Hardware) now 
suggests that Brandenburg does not apply at all to speech communicat-
165 Id. at 632. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 631–32. 
168 Id. 
169 See Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993 (2002) (Stevens, J. respecting denial of certiorari). 
170 Id. at 995. 
171 Id. 
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ing information.  It is worth considering, therefore, whether it is 
plausible for courts such as the Fourth Circuit, and potentially even 
Justice Stevens, to arrive at this conclusion. 
The best way to address this issue is to step back from the narrow 
focus on the three-part Brandenburg standard—requiring proof of in-
citement, imminent danger, and intent—and instead approach Bran-
denburg through the prism of the broader concerns that underlie the 
Court’s political speech jurisprudence—that is, the concerns that 
comprise what I have termed the Brandenburg paradigm.  After under-
taking this analysis it becomes clear that the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
in Rice and Justice Steven’s suggestions about Brandenburg and teach-
ing speech in McCoy are incompatible with these broader free speech 
concerns.  As in the case of true threats, it is easiest to see the conflict 
between the Brandenburg paradigm and lenient free speech standards 
proposed in cases such as Rice by focusing on the applicability to 
teaching speech of two central features of the Brandenburg paradigm:  
first, the paradigm’s requirement that the government prove con-
crete and immediate harm before censoring speech, and second, the 
paradigm’s emphasis on listener responsibility and the complemen-
tary requirement that perpetrators of bad acts, rather than the speak-
ers urging those acts, be held liable for harms resulting from speech. 
The lenient standard proposed for teaching speech in Rice fails to 
meet the Brandenburg paradigm’s requirement that courts identify an 
immediate, concrete harm before attaching legal liability to the ex-
pressive activities of a speaker.  In the universe defined by the Rice 
standard, the publication of information that leads to the commission 
of an illegal act by an unrelated person several months or years later 
would render the publisher and author of the original publication li-
able for the ultimate act—even if the publisher and author did not 
know anything about the illegal act, did not encourage the illegal act, 
and did not intend that anyone use their expressive materials for an 
illicit purpose.172
The Fourth Circuit seems to suggest that the First Amendment 
would still protect the publication of some information—in the 
court’s terms, information communicated in the form of “entirely in-
172 Although the defendant in Rice stipulated to the intent, clear and present danger, and 
incitement parts of the Brandenburg standard, see Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 
233, 241–42 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997), the court ultimately decided that the Brandenburg stan-
dard does not apply to teaching speech, a ruling that effectively rendered the defendant’s 
stipulations irrelevant.  See id. at 243 (“[W]e hold, as urged by the Attorney General and 
the Department of Justice, that the First Amendment does not pose a bar to a finding that 
Paladin is civilly liable as an aider and abetter of Perry’s triple contract murder.”). 
1022 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:4 
 
 
nocent, lawfully useful speech,” in which the speaker did not specifi-
cally intend the information to be used for bad purposes.173  Con-
versely, the Fourth Circuit would remove constitutional protection 
from the speech of “those who would, for profit or other motive, in-
tentionally assist and encourage crime.”174  The Fourth Circuit’s con-
cession that some communication of information would still be pro-
tected by the First Amendment despite the inapplicability of 
Brandenburg does little to allay concerns about the effect of the 
Fourth Circuit’s ruling on the Constitutional protection of political 
speech.  In fact, this concession does little more than undercut the 
basic rationale for proscribing the dissemination of dangerous infor-
mation to begin with. 
The Fourth Circuit’s approach threatens to undermine Branden-
burg by converting every trial over the legality of teaching or informa-
tional speech into a trial about the speaker’s intent in communicat-
ing the potentially dangerous information.  Since the speaker’s intent 
will often be found in statements that bracket the information, the 
decision whether to protect the dissemination of potentially danger-
ous information will often depend on whether the information is 
communicated along with radical political advocacy, antisocial mes-
sages, or other sorts of challenges to the status quo.  Under such a 
standard, information concerning the profession of a hit man would 
be protected if it were packaged in a popular television program or 
movie, but exactly the same information would be subject to legal li-
ability if reprinted and distributed in a book containing a preface 
praising the amorality of the professional assassin and encouraging 
others to pursue this line of work.  The Fourth Circuit’s standard 
would return this particular branch of First Amendment law to an 
approach reminiscent of political speech trials in the early years of 
the twentieth century, in the sense that courts and juries would once 
again be encouraged to punish speakers based on the odious nature 
of their ideas. 
Not only does this approach undercut Brandenburg, it also renders 
senseless any attempt to allow the government to proscribe the dis-
semination of information because that information may be danger-
ous.  The sole justification for suppressing teaching or informational 
speech such as “oral advice, training exercises, and perhaps the prep-
aration of written materials” is that such speech “may create signifi-
173 Id. at 247 (“[T]he First Amendment may in some contexts stand as a bar to the imposi-
tion of liability on the basis of mere foreseeability or knowledge that the information one 
imparts could be misused for an impermissible purpose.”). 
174 Id. at 248. 
Apr. 2010] THE BRANDENBURG PARADIGM 1023 
 
 
cant public danger.”175  But if the decision whether a particular ex-
ample of dangerous information may or may not be punished or cen-
sored depends solely on whether the person communicating that in-
formation is “for profit or other motive, intentionally assist[ing] and 
encourag[ing] crime,”176 then the courts have abandoned the claim 
that the information itself is the problem.  Creating a separate cate-
gory for the control of “teaching speech” thus becomes merely a 
mechanism for circumventing the protection of political speech un-
der Brandenburg. 
At the end of the day, proponents of regulating teaching and in-
structional speech under a lower constitutional standard have failed 
to demonstrate why the various aspects of the Brandenburg paradigm 
should not apply to teaching speech as well as routine political advo-
cacy.  As noted above, the arguments for regulating teaching speech 
under a lower constitutional standard do not really focus on the na-
ture of the information being communicated in that speech.  Rather, 
the real focus is on the intent of the speaker in communicating in-
formation.  There is no explanation why relatively innocuous infor-
mation should be regulated under a lower standard simply because 
the speaker has bad motives.  After all, the speakers in many of the 
Court’s political advocacy cases also had bad motives, in the sense 
that they all proposed violent or illegal activity.  The fact that bad mo-
tives are tied to speech of a factual nature as opposed to speech cast 
in the form of advocacy does not remove that speech from the as-
sumptions embedded in the Brandenburg paradigm. 
The key to the Brandenburg paradigm is that speech should only 
be regulated if it creates immediate and serious harm.  The informa-
tion communicated in the two cases raising these issues—Rice and 
McCoy—does not come close to meeting this standard.  In Rice, the 
court dealt with a book whose author did little more than compile 
from the popular media information that was neither subtle nor par-
ticularly ingenious.177  It does not take great skill as a trainer of assas-
sins to figure out that a hit man should not drive his or her own car 
to the site of a job.178  The information communicated in McCoy was 
even more obvious.  Would it really have been news to any member of 
any gang anywhere in the country that spraying graffiti on walls in the 
175 McCoy, 537 U.S. at 995 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). 
176 Rice, 128 F.3d at 248. 
177 See Montgomery, supra note 143, and accompanying text. 
178 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 240 (describing the instructions for assassins in the book Hit Man). 
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gang’s neighborhood would announce the presence of that gang?179  
The fact is, the information in both Rice and McCoy was for the most 
part mundane, unoriginal, and widely available elsewhere.  The in-
formation falls far short of creating the kinds of immediate harms re-
quired by the Brandenburg paradigm, and no good explanation exists 
for why we should fear the dissemination of this fairly mundane in-
formation so much that it justifies lowering the constitutional stan-
dard. 
The courts have not explained why we should have a lower consti-
tutional standard for protecting expression containing information 
than for expression advocating certain policies or principles.  But, 
drawing logically from courts’ statements, expression containing in-
formation should be suppressed more freely because we fear what the 
recipients will do with the information.  Without a doubt, there is 
reason to fear what bad people will do with dangerous information.  
The question, however, is whether we have more to fear from infor-
mation than from advocacy.  In other words, do we have more reason 
to fear what the hypothetical bad person will do with dangerous in-
formation, or do we have more reason to fear what that same person 
will do after being exposed to violent advocacy that expressly insti-
gates the very bad acts that society fears?  In terms of legitimate social 
fears of bad consequences stemming from incendiary speech, for ex-
ample, is it worse for a speaker in the Claiborne Hardware scenario to 
rile up audience members to beat up people who violate the eco-
nomic boycott favored by the speaker, or is it worse for a speaker to 
describe to the audience members what type of bludgeon to use in 
the beatings? 
The Brandenburg paradigm resolves these questions by prohibiting 
the government from regulating speech based on assumptions about 
what bad people will do after hearing provocative speech.  The para-
digm does not assume that there will never be bad consequences 
from speech, it simply establishes a regime in which the responsibility 
for those bad consequences will rest with the person doing the illegal 
act, not the speaker.  The question is why that assumption should 
change when the expression in question contains information as op-
posed to advocacy.  Why should we allow the government to paternal-
istically assume that people are incapable of dealing with information 
that may be put to bad purposes when we do not allow the govern-
ment to paternalistically protect people from speech that expressly 
179 See McCoy, 282 F.3d at 630 (noting that the defendant advised his friends to increase their 
“tagging” activities). 
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endeavors to create the inclination to pursue those bad purposes?  If 
the government is constitutionally obligated to trust listeners to be 
capable of rejecting the express advocacy of illegal behavior, then 
logically the government should also be constitutionally obligated to 
trust listeners to be capable of reading or listening to information 
without using that information for illegal or antisocial ends. 
C.  The Regulation of Sexually Explicit Speech 
Both the true threats and teaching speech categories involve 
speech that is closely related to political advocacy.  The Court has 
created several other content-based speech regulation categories that 
do not relate directly or indirectly to political expression or advocacy.  
Obscenity is one of the most prominent examples of a nonpolitical, 
content-based speech regulation category.  Since the Court entered 
this arena in 1957, it has returned repeatedly to this category of 
speech, constantly reconfiguring the standard that applies to the reg-
ulation of speech within the category, sometimes subdividing sexually 
explicit speech into different subcategories with different standards, 
and often issuing opinions that directly contradict many of the con-
cerns that the Court expressed in its political speech cases.  The issue, 
then, is whether the principles and concerns embodied in the Bran-
denburg paradigm logically apply to the regulation of nonpolitical 
speech.  A brief rendition of the Court’s obscenity jurisprudence—
including a recent foray into the area in a case that closely resembles 
the Court’s advocacy decisions—will indicate that the Court could 
profit greatly from applying Brandenburg to this seemingly unrelated 
area of speech. 
For purposes of this discussion, it is unnecessary to move beyond 
the Court’s general obscenity standard, the much more lenient stan-
dard the Court applies to obscenity produced with children, and the 
Court’s recent decision to permit the government to prosecute the 
“pandering” of sexually themed speech that otherwise is constitution-
ally protected.  The Court’s general obscenity standard is, in constitu-
tional terms, a relatively recent innovation.  The Court did not pro-
duce an opinion on the constitutional protection of sexually explicit 
speech until 1957, when it issued its decision in Roth v. United States.180  
Prior to that, most American courts adjudicating obscenity prosecu-
180 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957) (“[W]e hold that these statutes, applied according to the proper 
standard for judging obscenity, do not offend constitutional safeguards against convic-
tions based upon protected material, or fail to give men in acting adequate notice of what 
is prohibited.”). 
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tions had employed a standard derived from a nineteenth-century 
decision by the British House of Lords, Regina v. Hicklin.181  Hicklin 
produced a moral corruption standard for the regulation of sexually 
explicit materials.  Hicklin is usually viewed as standing for the propo-
sition contained in Lord Cockburn’s opinion, which stated the fol-
lowing standard:  “the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency 
of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those 
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose 
hands a publication of this sort may fall.”182  There are multiple prob-
lems with this standard, including the fact that it presumes a degree 
of governmental authority to regulate morality, it sets the standard 
for corruption at the level of the most susceptible persons in society, 
and it contains no exemption for sexually explicit expression in works 
of legitimate art or literature.  Nevertheless, with occasional com-
plaints from lower court judges about the Victorian nature of this 
standard,183 Hicklin provided the model for obscenity prosecutions in 
American courts until the mid-1950s. 
When the Supreme Court finally got around to applying the First 
Amendment to sexually explicit speech in Roth v. United States,184 it 
modified the mechanics of Hicklin without abandoning Hicklin’s em-
phasis on the government’s need to regulate morally corrupting ex-
pressive materials.  The Court did not prohibit the government from 
regulating obscenity; indeed, it reiterated the proposition that ob-
scenity is not protected by the First Amendment at all.185  This reaf-
firmed what the Court had stated in dicta fifteen years earlier, that 
certain kinds of speech—such as the lewd and the obscene—“are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity.”186  The Roth Court also did not prohibit the government from re-
gulating speech that deviates from the dominant ethos of the com-
munity.  Indeed, protecting the dominant ethos of the community is 
at the heart of the Roth standard, which establishes as the test for con-
181 (1868) 3 L.R.Q.B. 360. 
182 Id. at 371. 
183 See, e.g., United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (responding to Hick-
lin, Judge Learned Hand stated, “I hope it is not improper for me to say that the rule as 
laid down, however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not seem to me 
to answer to the understanding and morality of the present time”). 
184 354 U.S. 476. 
185 See id. at 485 (“We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech or press.”). 
186 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (citation omitted). 
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stitutionally unprotected obscenity “whether to the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme 
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests.”187
Nothing that the Court has done since 1957 has removed this as-
pect from its obscenity jurisprudence.  The Court revisited its defini-
tion of obscenity several times in the decades following Roth, but it 
only managed to produce different variations on the themes Roth in-
troduced.188  References to the “average person,” “community stan-
dards,” and materials appealing to “prurient interests” continue to be 
mainstays of the Court’s obscenity jurisprudence to the present day.  
By the time the Court got around in 1973 to redefining the obscenity 
standard for what is, to date, the final time, the components of the 
standard had been well-honed.  It says something about the relative 
illiberality of the standard developed during the Warren Court era 
that the more conservative Burger Court did not have to make major 
changes in the constitutional analysis or the underlying constitutional 
theory that supported it. 
The components of the new constitutional definition of obscenity 
can be found in Miller v. California.189  The three-part Miller test re-
quires the government to prove that purportedly obscene materials 
are “prurient” according to “the average person” applying “contem-
porary community standards,” are patently offensive, and lack “seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”190  Although there 
are multiple problems with this analysis,191 the more interesting mat-
ter for present purposes is the Court’s discussion of its rationale for 
187 Roth, 354 U.S. at 489 (citation omitted). 
188 See A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of 
Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (restating the constitu-
tional test for obscenity to include:  (1) prurient appeal; (2) patent offensiveness; and (3) 
that the material be utterly without redeeming social value); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 
184, 191–92 (1964) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (holding that obscene work must be 
“‘utterly’ without social importance”); Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 
(1962) (noting that obscene material must have the element of “patent offensiveness” in 
reference to “customary limits of candor”). 
189 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
190 Id. at 24 (“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:  (a) whether ‘the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as 
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.” (citations omitted)). 
191 For example, what does “prurient” mean, and how are jurors supposed to define a word 
that many of them have never heard before; who is an “average” person; what do the 
words “contemporary” and “community” mean in the phrase “contemporary community 
standards;” and how does one distinguish between “serious” and non-serious literature or 
art? 
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permitting the government to continue suppressing expression sim-
ply because that expression deviates from the community’s moral 
norm. 
Much of this discussion is contained in a companion case to Miller, 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.192  The case involved an adult theater, 
which screened sexually explicit films to an audience of consenting 
adults.  Both the lower courts and the Supreme Court assumed that 
the theater had successfully barred minors from entering and had 
displayed adequate warnings to adults concerning the nature of the 
films shown.193  The argument on behalf of the theater, therefore, was 
that in the absence of any harm to consenting adults, the exhibition 
of obscene films to a willing audience should not be subject to regula-
tion under the First Amendment. 
In Paris Adult Theatre, the Court definitively rejected this consent-
ing-adults notion of First Amendment rights.  “[T]his Court has never 
declared [the protection of juveniles and unconsenting adults] to be 
the only legitimate state interests permitting regulation of obscene 
material.”194  The Court makes a passing reference to a harm ration-
ale for regulating obscenity before acknowledging that “there is no 
conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and ob-
scene material.”195  The Court’s primary emphasis, therefore, is an 
explicit endorsement of the morality principle—that is, the principle 
that the government has the authority to embrace a particular view of 
morality and enforce it through the law.  There are numerous refer-
ences in the decision to concepts such as the “right of the Nation and 
of the States to maintain a decent society,”196 and the authority of the 
government to concern itself with “the tone of the society, the mode, 
or to use terms that have perhaps greater currency, the style and 
quality of life, now and in the future.”197  The Court even suggests at 
the end of its opinion that what is being regulated in these cases may 
not deserve to be called communication at all.198  Control of obscene 
expressive materials, the Court contends, “is distinct from a control of 
reason and the intellect,” and “[w]here communication of ideas, pro-
tected by the First Amendment, is not involved . . . the mere fact that, 
192 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
193 Id. at 52–53. 
194 Id. at 57. 
195 Id. at 60–61. 
196 Id. at 59–60 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissent-
ing)). 
197 Id. at 59 (quoting Alexander Bickel, On Pornography:  Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, 
22 PUB. INT. 25, 25–26 (1971)). 
198 Id. at 61 n.12 (quoting Roth v. United States., 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)). 
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as a consequence, some human ‘utterances’ or ‘thoughts’ may be in-
cidentally affected does not bar the State from acting to protect le-
gitimate state interests.”199
This represents perhaps the ultimate deviation from the Branden-
burg paradigm of speech regulation:  concrete harms resulting from 
speech are not a prerequisite to the regulation of that speech; to the 
extent that concrete harms stemming from speech are part of the 
analysis at all, such harms may be assumed by the state and need not 
be proven—much less proven to be an immediate threat to the pub-
lic order; and finally, speech that falls outside the government’s certi-
fication as “serious” need not be considered speech at all without re-
gard to the fact that “some human ‘utterances’ or ‘thoughts’ may be 
incidentally affected.”  This regulatory regime is virtually unrecogniz-
able as arising from the same constitutional amendment as Branden-
burg.  Nevertheless, Miller and Paris Adult Theater do not represent the 
nadir of constitutional protection for sexually explicit speech.  There 
is yet another batch of precedents dealing with sexually explicit 
speech involving minors, in which the Court once again confronts 
the tension between the morality principle and the harm principle 
for regulating speech. 
The Court’s first efforts involving obscenity and minors defini-
tively endorsed the morality principle.  In New York v. Ferber,200 the 
Court upheld a New York child pornography statute without requir-
ing the state to satisfy the obscenity standards set forth in Miller.  The 
Court held that the first two components of Miller—the prurience 
and patent offensiveness elements—do not apply to the prosecution 
of child pornography.201  The Court even suggested that the third 
component of Miller—the artistic value element—may not apply to 
child pornography202 (though the Court contradicted itself later in 
the opinion by noting that presumptively protected artistically or sci-
entifically worthwhile materials would not amount to more than “a 
tiny fraction of the materials within the statute’s reach”).203  Other 
than leaving these materials open to prosecution with virtually no 
constitutional protection, the most significant thing about the Ferber 
opinion is the Court’s emphasis on permitting broad regulation of 
speech in order to shut down the market for certain expressive pref-
erences.  “The most expeditious if not the only practical method of 
199 Id. at 67. 
200 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
201 Id. at 761. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 773. 
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law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by im-
posing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or 
otherwise promoting the product.”204  The Court would later rein-
force this proposition by refusing to apply to child pornography the 
protections offered in Stanley v. Georgia,205 which permits individuals 
to possess legally obscene materials at home.206
The implications of the Court’s market-based theory of speech 
regulation are very broad.  Taken to its limit, the notion that the gov-
ernment may seek to proscribe speech in order to eliminate particu-
lar antisocial preferences would permit the government to regulate 
more than merely speech containing explicit depictions of antisocial 
preferences.  Logically, this notion would also allow the government 
to regulate any other speech—including legal speech—that feeds the 
preferences that the government is trying to eliminate.  Thus, in the 
child pornography area, this rationale would permit the government 
not only to regulate obscene materials that were produced using ac-
tual children, but also materials using young-looking adults, materials 
employing cartoons or computer-manipulated imagery, or even ma-
terials using the written word to describe situations involving children 
engaged in sexual activity. 
The government tried to do precisely this in the Child Pornogra-
phy Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA),207 only to have the Court strike 
down the statute and renounce much of what it had previously said in 
Ferber about the government’s ability to control antisocial preferences 
through the regulation of speech.  The entire tone of the Court’s 
opinion in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition208 stands in stark contrast to 
the tone of Ferber.  The majority opinion in Ferber is written as if the 
rules governing the government’s regulation of low-value speech have 
no connection whatsoever to the restrictions on government regula-
tion of speech in the Court’s high-value speech cases such as Branden-
burg.  In Free Speech Coalition, on the other hand, the Court not only 
draws heavily on the principles developed in the political speech 
area, it even cites several of the political speech cases to support its 
holding regarding the regulation of speech that is far removed from 
political advocacy.209
204 Id. at 760. 
205 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
206 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (holding that Stanley does not apply to cases 
coming within the Ferber rule). 
207 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000). 
208 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
209 Id. at 244 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); 
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990);  Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)). 
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The CPPA prohibited possession or distribution of any image in 
any medium that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexu-
ally explicit conduct.”210  In striking down this provision of the CPPA, 
the Court in Free Speech Coalition essentially limited Ferber to its facts, by 
adopting a concrete harm rationale for regulating child pornogra-
phy.  Thus, the government continues to have authority to regulate 
the production, distribution, and possession of sexually explicit mate-
rials that were produced using actual children, because in those in-
stances the expression would serve as a “permanent record of a 
child’s abuse,” the continued circulation of which “would harm the 
child who had participated.”211  The government does not have au-
thority, however, to regulate expressive materials produced without 
using actual children, even if the materials contain images that 
graphically depict what seem to be children engaged in explicit sex-
ual activity. 
The government’s rationale for seeking the broader regulatory 
authority directly implicates the Brandenburg paradigm in several 
ways, and the Court responds to the government’s argument by di-
rectly appealing to several components of the Brandenburg paradigm.  
The government’s rationale for regulating sexually explicit speech 
that appears to but does not actually involve minors is that such 
speech “whets the appetites of pedophiles and encourages them to 
engage in illegal conduct.”212  The Court rejects this rationale by 
drawing directly on the Court’s political speech jurisprudence in 
three ways.  First, the Court notes that “[t]he mere tendency of 
speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for ban-
ning it.”213  Second, the Court reiterates that “[t]he normal method 
of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punish-
ment on the person who engages in it.”214  Finally, the Court con-
cludes that the government could not be granted the authority to 
regulate speech when it had shown “no more than a remote connec-
tion between speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and 
any resulting child abuse.”215
In Free Speech Coalition, we can see the model for applying the 
Brandenburg paradigm outside the context of political speech.  First, 
there is a reliance on the harm principle as the sole rationale for gov-
210 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000). 
211 Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 249. 
212 Id. at 253. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001)). 
215 Id. 
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ernment regulation of speech.  Second, there is an insistence that 
proof of harm must be definitive and the harm must be immediate—
“remote connections” between speech and bad conduct are not suffi-
cient to justify regulating speech.  Third, unless the speaker him or 
herself engages in the relevant bad conduct (in this case, by produc-
ing sexually explicit materials using actual children), then there is a 
total shift of responsibility for any bad acts from the speaker to the ac-
tor.  Finally, and most importantly, there is a strong emphasis on the 
proposition that government attempts to control speech are really 
government attempts to control thought, which the government may 
do only as a last resort and only in the face of a dire emergency.  
There is a strong hint, therefore, that the prevailing free-speech ju-
risprudence is incompatible with the morality principle that has al-
ways governed the regulation of sexually explicit materials, first under 
Hicklin’s conception that such materials may “corrupt those whose 
minds are open to such immoral influences,” and later under the 
more nebulous Roth/Miller formulation that “prurient” and “patently 
offensive” materials are outside the scope of the First Amendment al-
together. 
If consistently applied, the approach taken by the Court in Free 
Speech Coalition would represent a hopeful sign that the Court was re-
treating from its embrace of a subdivided First Amendment, in favor 
of a more conceptually unified approach based on a more coherent 
theory of the proper role of human expression in a modern democ-
racy.  Unfortunately, the Court has never been consistent in these 
matters, least of all in the area of obscenity regulation.  Contrast the 
approach taken by the Court in Free Speech Coalition, for example, with 
the approach taken by the Court in its most recent obscenity deci-
sion, United States v. Williams.216  Williams is a successor case to Free 
Speech Coalition.  After the Court struck down much of the CPPA, 
Congress amended the statute to add a pandering section, which 
provides criminal penalties of up to twenty years in prison for anyone 
who “advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solic-
its . . . material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended 
to cause another to believe, that the material or purported material 
is, or contains . . . a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.”217  The key to understanding the operation 
of this statute is that someone could violate the statute by “promot-
ing” materials as containing visual depictions of actual minors even 
216 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008). 
217 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2006). 
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though the material being promoted does not actually contain visual 
depictions of actual minors.  In other words, someone could be con-
victed under the pandering section of the statue for promoting mate-
rials that are themselves constitutionally protected under Free Speech 
Coalition. 
Just as the tone and approach of the Court’s opinion in Free Speech 
Coalition deviated sharply from its earlier opinion in Ferber, the tone 
and approach of Williams deviates equally sharply from Free Speech Coa-
lition.  Only six years after producing an opinion that for all practical 
purposes renounced the long-standing theoretical basis of the 
Court’s obscenity jurisprudence, the Court then turns around in Wil-
liams and essentially takes it all back.  The Court even starts its opin-
ion in Williams by expressly reaffirming the morality principle as ap-
plied to the regulation of obscenity:  “We have long held that obscene 
speech—sexually explicit material that violates fundamental notions 
of decency—is not protected by the First Amendment.”218  By author-
izing the government to criminalize speech that runs contrary to po-
litical majority’s “fundamental notions of decency,” the Court implic-
itly renounces the application in obscenity cases of the ethical 
agnosticism mandate that is the linchpin of the Court’s political 
speech jurisprudence.  And having renounced the cornerstone of the 
Brandenburg paradigm, it is not difficult to understand why the Court 
would refuse to apply the remainder of that paradigm as well. 
The defendant in Williams raised many of the aspects of the Bran-
denburg paradigm that the Court had already endorsed in Free Speech 
Coalition.  In addition to the content regulation aspect of the para-
digm, the defendant argued that the statutory provision at issue in 
Williams did not satisfy the harm principle (because the statutory pro-
hibition was not limited to individuals possessing or disseminating 
materials using actual children), did not require the government to 
prove that the pandering speech led immediately to the relevant 
harm, and punished the speaker even though that speaker bore no 
responsibility for the ultimate illegal action (that is, the purchase or 
possession of materials containing depictions of children engaged in 
sexual activity).  Williams is an exceedingly strange decision, in the 
sense that it permits government officials to outlaw one set of expres-
sive materials simply for inaccurately referring to another set of ex-
pressive materials that the Court has declared constitutionally pro-
tected.  The Court reaches this result based on “the principle that 
offers to give or receive what is unlawful to possess have no social 
218 Williams, 128 S. Ct at 1835. 
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value and thus, like obscenity, enjoy no First Amendment protec-
tion.”219  The flaw in this logic is that if the offeror does not actually 
possess unlawful materials to begin with, then there is no possibility 
of that person doing anything that implicates the harm (i.e., distrib-
uting expressive materials depicting actual minors involved in sexual 
activity) that Free Speech Coalition identified to render the materials 
constitutionally unprotected.  In Williams, the Court abandons the 
speech regime based on the harm principle, which it seems to have 
adopted in Free Speech Coalition, and returns to a regime that revolves 
around the morality principle, as evident in Hicklin, Roth, Miller, and 
Ferber. 
To sum up the relationship between the Court’s obscenity juris-
prudence and the Brandenburg paradigm, except for one brief devia-
tion in Free Speech Coalition, the Court has adhered closely to the no-
tion that the government has the authority to use its power to 
regulate speech in order to advance the particular sexual ethos fa-
vored by the community’s political majority.  This model for speech 
regulation does not merely allow the government to advance a par-
ticular set of behavioral mandates, it also allows the government to 
favor certain aspects of the human personality.  According to the 
Court, obscenity is unprotected by the First Amendment because it 
sought a reader who “looks for titillation, not . . . intellectual con-
tent.”220
Needless to say, this is deeply inconsistent with the predicates of 
the Brandenburg paradigm.  The Brandenburg paradigm does not per-
mit the government to use its authority to regulate speech to favor 
the majority’s preferred set of ideas, precepts, or attitudes.  Indeed, if 
the same social attitudes and ideologies that are embodied in obscen-
ity are cast instead in the form of advocacy, the Court has agreed for 
over fifty years that the political speech standard applies.221  In other 
words, the advocacy of licentiousness is protected, but the depiction 
of licentiousness is not.  If even the Court recognizes that sexual ad-
vocacy is on a par with political advocacy, then the Court’s continued 
willingness to permit the government to regulate obscenity amounts 
to a form/content distinction.  But if the Court is unwilling to accept 
that distinction in the context of government regulation of political 
219 Id. at 1841. 
220 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966). 
221 See Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 
689 (1959) (“[The Constitution’s] guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas 
that are conventional or shared by a majority.  It protects advocacy of the opinion that 
adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax.”). 
Apr. 2010] THE BRANDENBURG PARADIGM 1035 
 
 
discourse using the word “fuck,”222 then why is it willing to accept the 
distinction in the obscenity context?  The answer is that the Court has 
concluded that sexually explicit speech is different in kind from 
other speech that it considers more important.  But that decision it-
self violates the central precept of the Brandenburg paradigm, which is 
that government agencies—a term that includes the courts—may not 
infuse the law with their own moral or political judgments about the 
relative value of one type of expressive content versus another.  Ironi-
cally, the only way to justify leaving obscenity outside the protective 
umbrella defined by the Brandenburg paradigm is to violate the Bran-
denburg paradigm. 
If the Court were to correct its inconsistent approach to the regu-
lation of obscenity under the first part of the Brandenburg paradigm, 
then it would be quite easy to apply the rest of that paradigm to the 
government regulation of sexually explicit speech.  The Court itself 
has provided a model for how to accomplish this in its Free Speech Coa-
lition opinion.  As in that opinion, the application of the Brandenburg 
paradigm would still permit the government to regulate obscenity if 
the government could demonstrate an actual, immediate, and con-
crete harm arising from the speech.  Thus, the government clearly 
could regulate the possession and distribution of materials produced 
through coercion and could continue to regulate the possession and 
distribution of materials containing imagery of underage children 
participating in sexual activity.  The government also could ensure 
that sexually explicit expressive materials were not distributed or dis-
played to unwilling adults or children.  But it is deeply inconsistent 
with the Brandenburg paradigm for the government to outlaw expres-
sive materials simply because they display imagery that a majority of 
the population finds morally repulsive or because the materials excite 
responses from viewers that relate to sex rather than more traditional 
intellectual concerns or interests. 
D.  The Regulation of Student Speech in Public Schools 
The cases discussed in the previous three Sections have all in-
volved situations in which the Court created a separate body of First 
Amendment jurisprudence that deviated from the Brandenburg para-
digm because of the content of the speech being regulated.  This is 
the most common way in which the Court has subdivided speech to 
avoid Brandenburg.  But the Court has devised other avoidance me-
222 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning the conviction of a man for 
wearing a jacket bearing the inscription “fuck the draft” in a public courthouse). 
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chanisms, as well.  In several sets of cases, for example, the Court has 
used the place or context in which the speech occurs to limit the pro-
tections that Brandenburg would otherwise offer for the same speech.  
One set of cases in which the context rather than the content of 
speech determines the degree of constitutional protection for that 
speech involves the speech of government employees.223  Another set 
of cases involves private persons whose speech is financed by the gov-
ernment.224  A third set of cases involves the speech of students in 
public schools.  This Section uses the school cases to consider 
whether the Brandenburg paradigm could reasonably be applied to 
situations in which the place, rather than the content of speech, de-
termines First Amendment rights. 
The Supreme Court has issued four opinions involving student 
speech, which are relatively easy to summarize, but much more diffi-
cult to reconcile.  In the three content-based First Amendment subdi-
visions discussed above, some of the cases discussing these subdivi-
sions directly incorporate many of the values present in the 
Brandenburg paradigm, while other opinions are written as if Branden-
burg and the principles it embodies have no application whatsoever to 
the new category of speech.  The same is true of the school speech 
cases.  The Court started out by defining this area of law with close 
attention to the kinds of concerns that motivated Brandenburg.  Dur-
ing the next forty years, the Court systematically abandoned those 
concerns in favor of an authoritarian approach under which the 
scope of student free speech diminished substantially in comparison 
with the government’s power to control speech that runs counter to 
the perspective of government officials. 
In the beginning, the Court made very little distinction between 
adult speech and student speech.  The Court began its first decision 
on the subject in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict225 with a rousing reminder that students and teachers do not 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the schoolhouse gate.”226  The rest of the opinion seems to indicate 
that the Court really meant it.  The case involved a group of students 
who were suspended from school for wearing black armbands to pro-
223 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (setting forth the First Amendment stan-
dard for speech by public employees on matters of public and private concern). 
224 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (setting forth the First Amendment standard 
for government restrictions on private individuals speaking on behalf of the govern-
ment). 
225 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
226 Id. at 506. 
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test the Vietnam War.  While the Court recognized the school au-
thorities’ need to structure the school day and maintain discipline in 
the classroom, the Court also emphasized that an “undifferentiated 
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the 
right to freedom of expression.”227  The Court went on to note that 
the citizenship of student speech must be justified by “something 
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness 
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”228  The Court also 
linked the censorship of student speech to constitutionally impermis-
sible official attempts to indoctrinate the students.  According to the 
Court, “state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism,” 
and students at those schools “may not be confined to the expression 
of those sentiments that are officially approved.”229  The Court then 
produced a rule governing student expression at public schools that 
strongly resembles the Brandenburg immediate harm standard:  
“where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the for-
bidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school,’ the prohibition [on student speech] cannot be sustained.”230  
In sum, the Court’s initial foray into the area of student speech pro-
duced something entirely compatible with the Brandenburg para-
digm—a mandate of no content or viewpoint regulation; a recogni-
tion that speech may only be censored when that speech creates a 
concrete and immediate harm; a further recognition that although it 
is always possible that antagonistic or dissenting speech may start a 
disturbance, “our Constitution says we must take this risk;”231 and fi-
nally, a general acknowledgment that even underage students must 
be respected as capable of hearing ideas they do not like without im-
mediately responding in antisocial ways. 
After setting the stage by applying something akin to the Branden-
burg paradigm to student speech, the Court then spent the next forty 
years taking back most of what it had said in Tinker.  The next three 
cases in which the Court addressed the First Amendment rights of 
students ostensibly carved narrow exceptions out of Tinker.  In reality, 
these three cases cut the heart out of Tinker, to the point that it is dif-
ficult to see how much, if any, of the holding of Tinker actually sur-
vives. 
227 Id. at 508. 
228 Id. at 509. 
229 Id. at 511. 
230 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
231 Id. at 508 (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)). 
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In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,232 for example, the Court 
upheld the suspension of a high school student who had used sexual 
innuendo in a speech nominating someone for an elected student 
government office.233  Although the Court’s majority opinion de-
scribes the innuendo as “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual 
metaphor,”234 a review of the full text of the speech reveals that it fell 
far short of that description.235  Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the 
school had the authority to punish Fraser as part of its effort to incul-
cate in students the inappropriateness of using “vulgar and offensive 
terms in public discourse.”236  In contrast to the adult world, the 
Court held that in the school context the authorities could impose an 
offensiveness standard on speech, such that speech may be censored 
if it offends others—even if the speech poses no threat of a serious 
disruption of the school’s operations. 
The notion that public schools can use censorship as a means of 
exercising control over the academic curriculum is also a central fea-
ture of the Court’s next opinion dealing with student speech, Hazel-
wood School District v. Kuhlmeier.237  Kuhlmeier involved a public high 
school principal’s decision to pull from the school newspaper two ar-
ticles written by journalism students.238  One article dealt with student 
pregnancy and the other dealt with the effects of divorce on stu-
dents.239  Both articles represented serious efforts to deal with these 
subjects in a mature way.  The principal nevertheless pulled the arti-
cles based on his objections to the fact that the articles identified sev-
eral of the persons mentioned and also that the articles discussed 
both sexual activity and birth control.240  Rather than treating this as 
simply as a matter of a newspaper publisher spiking a story that he 
did not like, the Court instead broadened its analysis to encompass 
student speech arising in any curricular context.  Thus, the Court’s 
own phrasing of the holding in Kuhlmeier is that “educators do not of-
fend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the 
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
232 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
233 Id. at 678. 
234 Id. 
235 Perhaps for this reason the full text of the speech appears only in the concurring opinion 
in Fraser.  See id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
236 Id. at 683 (majority opinion). 
237 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
238 Id. at 262. 
239 Id. at 263. 
240 Id. 
Apr. 2010] THE BRANDENBURG PARADIGM 1039 
 
 
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”241
At one level, this phrasing of the Kuhlmeier holding is uncontro-
versial.  Certainly school officials have the authority to insist that stu-
dents refrain from submitting in a biology class a term paper on the 
latest developments in the indie music scene.  But at another level, 
Kuhlmeier performs radical surgery on Tinker.  First, Kuhlmeier limits 
the Tinker disruption standard in the sense that it now applies only to 
noncurricular matters.  This is a radical change because Kuhlmeier de-
scribes the school’s curricular concerns in expansive terms:  “activities 
may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether 
or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they 
are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular 
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.”242  Else-
where, the Court in Kuhlmeier refers several times to Fraser’s concept 
of the curriculum as including instruction in matters of decorum and 
the inculcation of “the shared values of a civilized social order.”243  
This broad characterization of the public school curriculum raises 
the specter not only of students being punished for expressing in 
class disfavored views of some political or social policy but also the 
prospect of students being sanctioned for expressing dissenting views 
outside of class if those views deviate from the officially sanctioned 
“shared values of a civilized social order.” 
This latter possibility became reality in the Court’s most recent 
student speech case, Morse v. Frederick.244  In this case the Court up-
held the suspension of a high school student who held up a banner 
with the inscription “BONG HiTS 4 Jesus” across the street from his 
school at a time when the Olympic torch was passing by the school.245  
The school’s explanation for suspending the student was that the 
banner violated the school policy discouraging drug use, and that ex-
planation was good enough for the Court.246  In First Amendment 
terms, the majority’s decision in Morse is almost as cryptic as the stu-
dent’s message that gave rise to that case.  The Court’s decision 
rested on two propositions.  First, from Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier, 
the Court synthesized the basic proposition that schools are different, 
in the sense that (quoting Fraser) “the constitutional rights of stu-
241 Id. at 273. 
242 Id. at 271. 
243 Id. at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)). 
244 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
245 Id. at 397. 
246 Id. at 398. 
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dents in public school are not automatically coextensive with the 
rights of adults in other settings.”247  Second, the Court used several 
Fourth Amendment cases involving school searches to support its 
pronouncement that deterring drug use in schools is an “important” 
if not “compelling” state interest.248  From the Court’s perspective, the 
combination of these two factors was sufficient to override any First 
Amendment interest and uphold the school’s decision to suspend the 
student. 
The difficulty with the Court’s analysis in this case starts with the 
Court’s acceptance of the school principal’s interpretation of the 
meaning of the student’s banner.  First of all, it is by no means clear 
that the banner was intended to encourage drug use.  A literal read-
ing of the banner produces the conclusion that it was simple non-
sense.  In light of the nonsensical phrasing of the banner, the stu-
dent’s own explanation is enlightening.  The student explained that 
the banner was phrased oddly in order to attract the attention of the 
television cameras that were on the street to record the Olympic 
torch.249  All things considered, the student’s explanation seems plau-
sible, and the principal seems less like a conscientious disciplinarian 
and more like a Ferris Bueller character who did not quite get the joke. 
Oddly enough, in some ways the principal’s interpretation should 
have made the case more difficult for her to win.  If the principal’s 
interpretation of the banner were correct, it would be hard not to 
construe the banner as containing ideas worthy of First Amendment 
protection under Tinker.  After all, under the principal’s construction 
of events, the student was engaging in a discussion of a public policy 
issue, not only outside the classroom, but outside the school itself, in 
a public forum, in a manner that was not disrupting the school’s edu-
cational mission.  The bottom line is that the principal simply did not 
like the student’s message.  The principal responded to this interpre-
tation of events with the incoherent assertion (which the Court seems 
to have accepted) that the student “was not disciplined because the 
principal of the school ‘disagreed’ with his message, but because his 
speech appeared to advocate the use of illegal drugs.”250  But if, as the 
principal argued, the student was advocating the use of illegal drugs, 
then the student was disciplined precisely because the principal dis-
agreed with his message. 
247 Id. at 404–05 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682). 
248 Id. at 406. 
249 Id. at 407. 
250 Id. at 398. 
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Nothing in the Morse decision ostensibly changes any of the 
Court’s previous jurisprudence concerning student speech under the 
First Amendment.  Two members of the majority in Morse even filed a 
concurring opinion emphasizing that the decision did nothing to re-
strict student speech “that can plausibly be interpreted as comment-
ing on any political or social issue, including speech on issues such as 
‘the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for me-
dicinal use.’”251  This attempt to assuage the concerns of student 
speakers does little to help the majority, since it suggests the unlikely 
prospect that the Court would have protected the student’s speech in 
Morse if the student had added the words “Students Should Have the 
Right to Say” above the words “BONG HiTS 4 Jesus.”  The concurring 
opinion also does little to help the majority explain why the Court 
feels it has the authority to create a special rule for speech regarding 
drugs.  The best the concurring opinion can do is assert that “illegal 
drug use presents a grave and in many ways unique threat to the 
physical safety of students.”252  Unfortunately, this part of the concur-
ring opinion flies directly in the face of the longstanding First 
Amendment recognition that discussing something is entirely differ-
ent than doing it. 
Morse demonstrates that abandoning the Brandenburg paradigm 
even in a particular factual setting such as schools leads the Court 
away from disciplined oversight of arbitrary administrative authority 
and robs the Court of any framework within which to explain what 
speech is constitutionally protected and what speech is not.  In fact, 
all of the Court’s legitimate concerns about the need to regulate stu-
dent speech in the public school context can easily be addressed 
within the Brandenburg paradigm.  Three legitimate concerns surface 
in the school speech context:  the need to prevent disruption of aca-
demic activities; the need to prevent student speech that could be at-
tributed to the school and cause the school legal or other difficulties; 
and the need for the school to control the content of its curriculum.  
Each of these can be addressed within the Brandenburg paradigm. 
The need to prevent disruption is the easiest to address.  As Tinker 
itself recognizes, the term disruption cannot be interpreted so 
broadly as to include verbal disagreements or heated discussions of 
issues about students.  The Court only gives schools the authority to 
regulate serious disruption.253  If this term is interpreted to include 
251 Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting). 
252 Id. at 425. 
253 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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the verbal or physical interruption of classroom activities, then con-
trol of such activities can easily be carried out within the terms of the 
Brandenburg paradigm.  Nothing within the Brandenburg paradigm 
permits a speaker to disrupt the activities of others, and the paradigm 
clearly permits government to direct speech away from locations 
where speech is incompatible with other uses of the particular fo-
rum.254  Conversely, the Brandenburg paradigm provides helpful 
mechanisms for enforcing the schools’ obligation to permit student 
speech that does not result in a serious disruption of academic affairs.  
Tinker’s focus on serious disruption of classroom activities is compati-
ble with the Brandenburg paradigm’s focus on the need for govern-
ment to identify an immediate threat of concrete harm before sup-
pressing speech.  Likewise, the Brandenburg paradigm’s emphasis on 
listener responsibility coincides with the educational system’s empha-
sis on encouraging students to exercise their intellects and explore 
alternative perspectives on reality. 
Just as Tinker complements the Brandenburg paradigm, Brandenburg 
is compatible with the school’s interest in preserving control over its 
own speech and its curriculum.  The Brandenburg paradigm does sug-
gest, however, that there should be severe limitations on the efforts of 
schools to expand the concept of curriculum so much that they are 
able to exercise control over virtually every aspect of a student’s life 
while at school.  Thus, while a school certainly has the authority to 
educate students in subjects such as civics, history, philosophy, and 
political science, these subjects must be taught with a recognition of 
the student’s right to express his or her opinion on basic moral issues 
and the topics of the day.  Similarly, in situations analogous to the 
facts in Kuhlmeier, the school authorities must take the writer’s free 
speech into account when exercising control over forums for student 
expression such as student newspapers, magazines, and student as-
semblies.  The Brandenburg paradigm strongly suggests that a school 
board may not, on one hand, announce to its students that it “will not 
restrict free expression or diverse viewpoints within the rules of re-
sponsible journalism,”255 and then turn around and restrict free ex-
pression and suppress the viewpoints of students with which the au-
thorities disagree. 
254 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (“The crucial question is 
whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a 
particular place at a particular time.”). 
255 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 277 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted). 
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The implications of the Brandenburg paradigm deviate most sharp-
ly from the Court’s current approach to school speech cases in situa-
tions analogous to Fraser and Morse.  Under the Brandenburg para-
digm, some evidence of an immediate and concrete harm—such as a 
serious disruption of the school’s educational activities—would be 
necessary to suppress student speech outside the classroom.  No evi-
dence of such disruption was evident in either Fraser or Morse.  Al-
though one could conceive of situations in which a student’s use of 
vulgarity in a classroom situation could disrupt the educational en-
terprise—and therefore could be regulated or prohibited—the blan-
ket prohibition of vulgarity in situations outside the classroom cannot 
be defended under the Brandenburg paradigm. 
Since disruption is not an issue in situations such as Fraser, at-
tempts to defend a school’s regulation of speech such as that used by 
Mr. Fraser must therefore depend on similar arguments to those used 
by the school in Morse.  In other words, the school must claim that in 
addition to its function in educating students about traditional aca-
demic subjects, the school also has a role in enforcing on students 
mainstream notions of civility (as in Fraser) and requiring from stu-
dents absolute fealty to the official position regarding controversial 
issues of the day, such as the recreational use of drugs (as in Morse).  
Unfortunately, this definition of the school’s extra-educational role 
violates several central First Amendment precepts about the intellec-
tual independence of the citizenry.  These precepts are embodied in 
the portions of the Brandenburg paradigm that refer to the assump-
tion of listener acumen and incredulity.  Complementing the First 
Amendment mandate that the government respect the listener’s in-
dependence is the equally important mandate that the government 
must protect the speaker’s independence, in the sense that the 
speaker should be allowed to determine for him or herself how to 
communicate his or her ideas. 
The significant question in the school speech cases is whether 
these precepts, as embodied in the Brandenburg paradigm, should be 
diluted or abandoned with regard to persons who have not yet 
reached adulthood.  When the issues are reduced to their essence, 
the answer should be no.  This conclusion follows from the fact that 
under the Brandenburg paradigm, any student speech that disrupts 
the educational enterprise of a school may be suppressed by that 
school.  Once the possibility of disruption is removed from the equa-
tion, we are left with a situation in which government officials are 
seeking to coerce citizens (albeit young citizens) to parrot the official 
position on a range of public policy issues and matters of public de-
corum.  Under the Brandenburg paradigm this is an unacceptable use 
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of government power, and there is no good reason why the age of the 
person being coerced would alter the free speech analysis.  Even two 
members of the Morse majority recognized that the First Amendment 
is incompatible with efforts to broadly construe the public school’s 
educational mission to include control over student opinions and the 
speech expressing those opinions:  “The ‘educational mission’ argu-
ment would give public school authorities a license to suppress 
speech on political and social issues based on disagreement with the 
viewpoint expressed.  The argument, therefore, strikes at the very 
heart of the First Amendment.”256
This acknowledgment of limitations on the schools’ educational 
mission implicitly recognizes a sharp distinction between education 
and indoctrination.  Under the First Amendment, schools must al-
ways do the former but may never do the latter.  Unfortunately, the 
majority failed to apply this distinction to the facts of Morse itself.  The 
notion that the school banned the student’s speech in order to pro-
tect the physical safety of the students is absurd, because speech is dif-
ferent than action.  The notion that the student’s speech somehow 
was part of the school’s educational mission is equally absurd, given 
the fact that the speech occurred outside of class and related to no 
subject in the curriculum.  We are left in Morse with a situation in 
which the school asserted as a matter of policy one point of view on a 
public policy issue and the student got suspended for asserting a con-
trary point of view.  Since even the Morse majority seems to acknowl-
edge that students have a First Amendment right to express political 
points of view,257 little is left of the majority’s rationale for ruling in 
favor of the school. 
Once one recognizes that schools may never use their educational 
mission as a license to instill the government’s preferred values in 
students, then there is no good theoretical distinction to be made be-
tween the school speech cases and the adult speech cases that are 
currently governed by Brandenburg.  In both situations, the question is 
whether the government may use its authority to control dangerous 
actions as an excuse to suppress what it believes to be dangerous 
thoughts.  The Brandenburg paradigm is predicated on the notion that 
it is incompatible with democratic self-governance for the govern-
ment to control expression as a means of controlling the thoughts of 
citizens.  If this is an accurate description of what the government is 
doing in the school speech cases, then the Court’s current approach 
256 Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring). 
257 Id. at 403–04 (reaffirming Tinker). 
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to student speech in public schools gives the authorities too much 
power over expression and student thought.  Conversely, if Branden-
burg would permit school officials to fulfill their educational respon-
sibilities by preventing disruption of the educational atmosphere, 
then the school speech cases could easily be brought within the ambit 
of the Brandenburg paradigm without damaging the schools’ legiti-
mate functions.  The only downside to doing so would be to force 
school officials to tolerate certain examples of student speech with 
which they disagree.  This is hardly an argument against applying the 
Brandenburg paradigm to the school context, however; it simply brings 
the constitutional obligations of government educators into line with 
the obligations that already apply to the rest of the government. 
III.  FEAR OF RIGHTS:  THE CASE AGAINST SUBDIVIDING THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
The four categories of speech discussed in the previous Part rep-
resent examples of what Harry Kalven, Jr. once labeled the “two-level 
theory” of free expression protection under the First Amendment.258  
This theory holds that there should be one level of protection for po-
litical speech and advocacy and another level of protection for non-
political speech.  In the modern era, this has mutated into the “multi-
leveled theory” of free expression protection, since the Supreme 
Court has created multiple categories of First Amendment jurispru-
dence to cover different types of speech.  The Supreme Court has 
never offered a theoretically sophisticated explanation for subdivid-
ing the First Amendment in a way that provides a much lower level of 
protection for nonpolitical speech than for political speech.  Academ-
ics have attempted to fill this gap with several explanations of their 
own. 
Kalven coined his term in response to the Court’s first obscenity 
decision in Roth v. United States.259  Roth was litigated by both the peti-
tioner and the government as a clear and present danger case—in 
other words, as if it were covered by the terms of what would later be-
come the Brandenburg paradigm.260  Justice Douglas interrogated the 
government attorney in Roth closely about whether the pertinent 
258 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10. 
259 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
260 For two accounts of the oral argument in Roth, see EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK 
EVERYWHERE:  THE LAW OF OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS 298–318 (1992); Mat-
thew Benjamin, Possessing Pollution, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 733, 734–36 (2007). 
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clear and present danger was the danger of “be[ing] shocked.”261  
The government attorney responded by citing a series of dangers, in-
cluding the long-term behavioral changes brought on by the “break-
ing down of morals.”262  This discussion became irrelevant, however, 
when the Court decided to adopt Felix Frankfurter’s view that the 
clear and present danger analysis did not even apply, since obscenity 
was outside the Constitution altogether.  This approach harkens back 
to two earlier opinions in which the Court refused to apply the clear 
and present danger analysis to nonpolitical speech.263  In both cases 
the Court’s rationale is little more than the ipse dixit that the speech 
in question did not fall within the Constitution and therefore could 
not claim the protection of the Court’s political advocacy jurispru-
dence.  The most famous articulation of this theme appears in Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise 
any Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene, the 
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace.  It has been well observed that such utterances are 
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.264
The Chaplinsky formulation that certain kinds of speech are out-
side the First Amendment altogether relieves the government of 
demonstrating interests of a sufficient type and magnitude to satisfy 
the government’s obligations under the Brandenburg paradigm, but it 
fails to explain why certain kinds of speech are deemed low-value.  In-
stead of explaining why the government has the authority to seek 
control over certain types of thought and expression by its citizens, 
the Court just says so. 
To the extent that the Chaplinsky Court offers any explanation of 
the “two-level” theory of the First Amendment, that explanation may 
now be obsolete in light of more recent developments in the Court’s 
free speech jurisprudence.  In the quotation above, the Court implies 
that there are three reasons for placing certain types of speech out-
261 Benjamin, supra note 260, at 734. 
262 Id. 
263 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (declining to apply the clear and pre-
sent danger analysis to a criminal libel statute); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 571–72 (1942) (declining to apply the clear and present danger analysis to fighting 
words). 
264 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
Apr. 2010] THE BRANDENBURG PARADIGM 1047 
 
 
side the First Amendment.  The first is that some kinds of speech “are 
no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”265  This rationale cannot 
survive Cohen v. California, in which the Court recognized that the 
First Amendment protects the expression of emotions to the same ex-
tent as it protects the expression of ideas.266  The second and third 
reasons the Chaplinsky Court offers for denying constitutional protec-
tion to some kinds of speech are that the value of some speech is 
outweighed “by the social interest in order and morality.”267  The gov-
ernment’s interest in protecting social order is no reason to exclude 
speech from the protection of the Brandenburg paradigm, because 
that paradigm by its very terms protects the government’s interest in 
preserving order.  The Brandenburg paradigm protects speech only 
until that speech presents a clear and present danger of immediately 
disrupting the social order.  Chaplinsky’s final rationale—that the 
government has an interest in suppressing individual liberty such as 
free expression in order to protect the community’s collective moral-
ity—no longer carries weight in light of two developments subse-
quent to Chaplinsky:  first, the Court’s recognition that the govern-
ment has no authority under the First Amendment to restrict 
expression attacking conventional morality,268 and second, the 
Court’s extension of substantive due process privacy protection to 
those engaged in behavior that deviates significantly from society’s 
moral mainstream.269
If the Court’s explanation for the two-level theory of the First 
Amendment is unsatisfactory, academic attempts to provide alterna-
tive explanations fare no better.  Many of these academic attempts 
focus on particular types of speech, arguing that they should not be 
subject to the same rigorous protection as political advocacy.  For ex-
ample, Frederick Schauer has argued that the Court should not pro-
tect sexually explicit materials under the First Amendment because 
obscene materials are not “speech.”270  These materials are not 
265 Id. at 572. 
266 See Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (“We cannot sanction the view that the 
Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or 
no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more 
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.”). 
267 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
268 See Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 
689 (1959) (extending First Amendment protection to moral as well as political advo-
cacy). 
269 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (striking down a Texas sodomy statute 
as a violation of the federal constitutional right of privacy). 
270 See Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”:  An Exercise in the In-
terpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 922 (1979). 
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“speech,” Schauer argues, because they do not engage the cognitive 
faculties, but rather are designed to elicit a purely physical effect—
sexual arousal.271  Along similar lines, Charles Lawrence argued sev-
eral decades ago that verbal, racist insults (including those that do 
not fall into the traditional category of fighting words) should be 
deemed unprotected by the First Amendment because such speech 
“is experienced [by the target of the speech] as a blow, not a prof-
fered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that dialogue will 
follow.”272  At the other end of the ideological continuum, Robert 
Bork famously argued that that the First Amendment should apply to 
nothing more than a narrow category of mainstream political 
speech.273  In Bork’s blunt terms, “constitutionally, art and pornogra-
phy are on a par with industry and smoke pollution.”274
There are particular flaws specific to each of these proposals.  
With regard to Professor Schauer’s proposal to exclude pornography 
from the First Amendment, for example, there is the problem that all 
speech requires mental intermediation to have any effect.  Thus, 
treating sexually explicit speech as if it were functionally indistin-
guishable from a physical sex toy simply does not accurately reflect 
the complex reality of the expression in question.  Other problems 
arise with regard to proposals to strip constitutional protection from 
racist insults and other hate speech.  It violates every precept of de-
mocratic self-governance to single out certain content as being so in-
herently traumatic that the government cannot ever allow that con-
tent to be heard.  Efforts to justify the government’s censorship of 
hate speech on the ground that the content is socially dysfunctional 
cede to the government the deeply undemocratic authority to distin-
guish between good and bad content.  Finally, Professor Bork’s at-
tempt to limit the First Amendment to a narrow category of mundane 
political speech fails on definitional terms.  As Alexander Meiklejohn 
discovered in his early exploration of free speech theory, the isolation 
of explicitly political speech is an unsatisfactory way of limiting the 
scope of the First Amendment, given the extent to which other types 
271 Id. 
272 Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:  Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 431, 452. 
273 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 
(1971) (arguing that the First Amendment should protect only explicitly political speech, 
and that constitutional protection should be denied to all scientific, literary, and porno-
graphic speech, as well as speech advocating illegal activity or forcible overthrow of the 
government). 
274 Id. at 29. 
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of speech influence political attitudes.275  If the First Amendment is 
primarily concerned with fostering the intellectual independence of 
an active and involved citizenry, then all speech must be protected, 
not just the speech of politicians. 
Aside from their individual defects, these disparate efforts to carve 
certain types of speech out of the First Amendment share a deeply 
flawed common theme.  This theme is to interpret the First Amend-
ment as applying only to speech that is rational, moderate, emotion-
ally muted, and inoffensive.  In addition, all of the commentators dis-
cussed above seem to agree with the proposition that speech 
regarding mainstream politics and governance should be afforded 
special prominence within the First Amendment constellation.  These 
commentators seem to regard all other types of speech as, at best, so-
cially useless “casual chit-chat” (to borrow a phrase Richard Posner 
once used to describe speech that he refused to protect under the 
First Amendment276) and, at worst, socially harmful efforts to under-
mine the commonwealth.  In Cass Sunstein’s version of this theory, 
expression is covered by the First Amendment only if it is “intended 
and received as part of the exchange of ideas,” and expression is pro-
tected under the highest standard only if it is “intended and received 
as part of public deliberation about some issue.”277  The key to all 
these proposals is that once we move beyond the “core” of main-
stream political speech, the usual First Amendment rules do not ap-
ply, or do not apply with sufficient rigor, to significantly limit the 
government’s authority to restrict expression within peripheral cate-
gories of speech.  “Under current doctrine, and under any sensible 
system of free expression, speech that lies at the periphery of consti-
tutional concern may be regulated on a lesser showing of harm than 
speech that lies at the core.”278
275 Meiklejohn’s theory of the First Amendment was based on the proposition that “[t]he 
principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-
government.”  ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1960).  Despite his initial emphasis on the purely political fo-
cus of the First Amendment, Meiklejohn’s later work extended the protection of the 
amendment to a range of nonpolitical expressive materials, including “novels and dramas 
and paintings and poems,” on the theory that these nonpolitical materials contribute to 
the formation of political values that will eventually translate into direct political action 
such as voting.  Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 263. 
276 Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Casual chit-chat between two per-
sons or otherwise confined to a small social group is unrelated, or largely so, to [the] 
marketplace [of ideas], and is not protected [by the First Amendment].”). 
277 Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 796 (1993). 
278 Id. at 807. 
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The irony of these attempts to diminish the importance of all but 
mainstream political speech under the First Amendment is that the 
very effort to limit the scope of the Brandenburg paradigm to a nar-
rower range of overtly political speech itself violates the Brandenburg 
paradigm.  The Brandenburg paradigm requires the government to be 
agnostic with regard to the content of speech, permits the govern-
ment to regulate speech only in situations where the speech presents 
an immediate danger of social upheaval, and requires the govern-
ment to trust the good judgment of citizens to ignore speech that 
contains unhelpful, antisocial, or harmful content.  Proposals to 
permit the government to regulate nonpolitical speech more aggres-
sively than political speech violate each of these proscriptions. 
The restrictions on the government that are embedded in the 
Brandenburg paradigm are not just functions of the political speech 
context in which Brandenburg arose, nor can it even be said that the 
spirit of the Brandenburg paradigm is anchored in the First Amend-
ment alone.  The Brandenburg paradigm is not just an assertion of the 
First Amendment or free speech rights, but rather a statement about 
the very nature of constitutional democracy itself.  The Brandenburg 
paradigm embodies a larger vision of the role of government and the 
relationship between government and its citizens.  It is not entirely 
accurate to see this vision as one of limited government.  The Bran-
denburg paradigm would permit the government to be quite aggres-
sive in implementing the goals and objectives of the democratically 
elected majority.  The Brandenburg paradigm strictly limits govern-
ment, on the other hand, in situations where the government tries to 
direct the citizenry in the identification of its chosen goals and objec-
tives, or where a government dominated by those pursuing one set of 
ultimate goods attempt to foist their view of reality on those who per-
sist in pursuing conflicting views of ultimate goods.  Under the Bran-
denburg paradigm and the vision of constitutional democracy it em-
bodies, government is the means to a chosen end; it is not the agent 
that chooses that end. 
This vision of democracy explains each of the elements of the 
Brandenburg paradigm.  It explains why the government is prohibited 
from engaging in content or viewpoint regulation of speech, why the 
government is prohibited from regulating a speaker except when that 
speaker threatens immediate harm to others, and why the govern-
ment is required to respect the independent judgment of its citizens 
and is prohibited from engaging in any paternalistic regulation of 
speech.  This vision of government also reflects a deeply rooted 
Holmesian skepticism about the possibility of achieving collective 
consensus about ultimate goods.  Thus, citizens are expected to exer-
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cise independent judgment in arriving at their assessment of what ul-
timate goods society should pursue, even if that independent judg-
ment leads them to conclusions that might be viewed by the rest of 
society as deeply antisocial or antithetical to the common good. 
Contrary perspectives on the First Amendment, such as those dis-
cussed above, are deeply elitist assertions of power on behalf of the 
political majority controlling the government.  This elitism some-
times comes to the surface expressly in the Court’s decisions.  In the 
school speech cases, for example, the Court justifies the suppression 
of student speech on the ground that the school has an obligation to 
teach students what to think about certain issues and how to express 
themselves in general.279  Likewise, in cases concerning the regulation 
of sexually explicit speech, the Court refers to such speech as infring-
ing upon the majority’s moral community.280  The case mentioned 
above in which Judge Posner refused to protect an instance of “casual 
chit-chat” provides the third example.  In that case, Judge Posner ap-
plied a very particular view of what kind of speech deserves constitu-
tional protection.281  Not surprisingly, the kind of speech that Judge 
Posner viewed as worthy of protection is also the kind of speech that 
he and his highly-educated colleagues engage in as a matter of daily 
professional routine.  This view of the First Amendment, however, 
would completely strip constitutional protection from the very kinds 
of speech—that is, speech about personal matters, individual dreams 
and aspirations, and interpersonal relationships—that are most im-
portant to people outside the political classes.  Thus, under these 
theories of the First Amendment, those who engage in political activ-
ity, intellectual public discourse, and other elite activities will receive 
the many benefits of the Brandenburg paradigm, and those who en-
gage in lesser expressive activities will receive the First Amendment 
residue.  Whatever can be said of these theories, they certainly do not 
articulate a First Amendment jurisprudence for the masses. 
The irony here is that there is no reason to relegate the First 
Amendment to a narrow range of political topics that are of interest 
primarily to the political cognoscenti, because the Brandenburg para-
279 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (noting that school officials have the author-
ity to discourage drug use and also to restrict student speech celebrating illegal drug use). 
280 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (noting that legislatures have a legiti-
mate interest in regulating obscenity to protect “the social interest in order and morality” 
(citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)) (emphasis omitted)). 
281 See Swank, 898 F.2d at 1251 (contrasting casual chit-chat with “the advancement of knowl-
edge, the transformation of taste, political change, cultural expression, and the other ob-
jectives, values, and consequences of the speech that is protected by the First Amend-
ment”). 
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digm provides the government with all the tools necessary to pursue 
its legitimate regulatory interests in every category of speech.  As illus-
trated in the cases discussed in Part II, supra, the Brandenburg para-
digm is easily able to accommodate the government’s efforts to pro-
tect against harm involving speech in the form of threats, so-called 
“teaching speech,” school speech, and sexually explicit speech.  Any 
government effort to regulate speech in these areas beyond what the 
Brandenburg paradigm permits inevitably will involve the government 
in regulating the formulation and communication of ideas rather 
than the imposition of concrete harms—in other words it will involve 
precisely the sort of activity in which democratic governments should 
never be involved.  In the end, proponents of the current, multi-level 
theory of the First Amendment can justify the fracturing of free 
speech jurisprudence only if they reinterpret the basic nature of de-
mocratic governance itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Embedded in the Brandenburg paradigm that governs the regula-
tion of political speech under the First Amendment are several as-
sumptions about the nature of democracy and the relationship of 
democratic government to its citizens.  Foremost among these as-
sumptions is the principle that government should not paternalisti-
cally seek to substitute its own value judgments for those of its citi-
zens.  This leads to the central feature of the Brandenburg regulatory 
scheme, which is the proposition that speech should be prohibited 
only when that speech creates such an immediate and grave harm to 
the public welfare that no other option is available to the govern-
ment.  This Article has been devoted to assessing whether there is any 
good reason to abandon these assumptions as one moves from the 
regulation of political speech to the regulation of other types of ex-
pression.  The answer seems to be a resounding no.  People are just 
as capable of thinking for themselves outside the political arena as 
they are within it, and nonpolitical harms are just as easy to identify as 
political harms.  As it happens, the Court has, in the Brandenburg 
paradigm, a handy tool with which to simultaneously recognize the 
intellectual independence of its citizenry and greatly simplify free 
speech law, if the Court would only use it. 
 
 
 
 
 
